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ABSTRACT 
 Historical narratives and memories are highly-politicized and evolve in response 
to geopolitical developments. The Nanking Atrocity exemplifies the mutability and 
exploitation of historical narratives and public memory. Although the Atrocity occurred 
in the early stages of WWII and was adjudicated immediately following the conclusion 
of the war, it was not until several decades later, in the 1980s, that geopolitical shifts 
made the event relevant both domestically and internationally. By examining the factors 
that have influenced these narratives, it is possible to better comprehend the 
developments that have produced the highly-contested, contemporary Nanking Atrocity 
memories. The current international disputes between China and Japan, with the U.S. as 
a self-elected mediator, signify the consequences of public memory exploitation. 
Therefore, it is crucial to examine the factors that lead a nation to adopt public memory 
and construct historical narratives in order to overcome future obstacles in scholarship 
and international diplomacy.    
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Narratives and Memory: The Nanking Atrocity 
Introduction 
For all countries, the horrors of war become essential material in public memory 
construction, serving as interwoven threads in a national sense of identity. For both the 
Allies and the Axis nations, World War II had an irreparable impact on public memory. 
The brutal realities of this war remain constant in each nation’s collective memory of the 
era, as evidenced by the incredible attention that these events maintain in all spheres of 
society. World War II is a topic that is endlessly examined through scholarship and 
research and is a defining element in national education. The all-pervasiveness of World 
War II memory is demonstrated by the literary and cinematic obsession with these events, 
as the heroes and villains of the war are the focus of innumerable films, novels, and 
television shows.          
 Through public memory, the amalgamation of literary, cinematic, journalistic, and 
educational representations, a nation forms and reforms historical narratives. Although 
these narratives are constructed collectively through both official and unofficial sources, 
there is an undeniable rhetoric to these memories. The dynamic nature of public memory 
and historical narratives is evidenced by the Nanking Atrocity1, an event that has 
garnered significant international attention in the last several decades.    
 The proponents of historical narratives severely underexamine the fluidity of 
                                                             
1 This thesis will refer to the event as the Nanking Atrocity, although this title is less common than the 
Western “Rape of Nanking.” Given the political nature of most labels for the event, “Atrocity” is the least 
rhetorical, most accessible term of reference and will therefore be used subsequently. The nature of 
Nanking denominations will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter III.  
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these memories. Whether it be the popularity of certain memories or the very 
interpretations of events that fluctuate over time, there rarely exist any immutable, 
unchangeable national histories. Even such significant historical moments as the 
Holocaust, which now maintains a near ubiquitous placement in the memories of 
involved nations, are not ultimately impervious to the effects of time. The Nanking 
Atrocity exemplifies this variability; although the event occurred in the early stages of 
WWII and was adjudicated immediately following the conclusion of the war, Nanking 
Atrocity debates did not gain such international (or even domestic) attention until several 
decades later, when the shifting course of geopolitics made the event, once again, 
relevant. Economic and political developments within each nation necessitated the 
cultivation of a national identity. As this thesis will demonstrate, the pursuit of a unifying 
national identity led to evolving perceptions of the Atrocity in China, Japan, and the U.S. 
Ironically, these national identities are no more immutable than the historical narratives 
on which they are founded.  Thus, popularized by works such as Iris Chang’s The Rape of 
Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, the dynamics of Japan’s 1937 
seizure of China’s Nationalist capital, Nanking, reentered the international consciousness 
and became a highly-contested topic. These debates over the nature of the invasion were 
imbued with a sense of outrage that was directed not only at the Japanese aggressors, but 
also at the forces that prevented prior knowledge of these war crimes. For, while some 
early post-WWII generations may have known peripherally about the Nanking Atrocity, 
China’s sufferings were largely obscured by the formal onset of World War II, the 
subsequent trials, and the Cold War. Internally, even Chinese society was preoccupied 
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with other domestic debacles that directly followed the conclusion of WWII, including 
the Nationalist-Communist civil war, the Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution. 
These domestic challenges directed attention away from the Japanese atrocities and 
remained the major constructive (and destructive) force in Chinese national identity until 
the country’s political and economic status was secure enough to allow otherwise.  
Therefore, when Rape of Nanking memories were more widely publicized the 1980s and 
90s by figures like Chang, the world responded with unexpected voracity.    
 This resurgence of Nanking memory instigated tensions between China and 
Japan, as many Atrocity texts criticized Japan’s supposed lack of official apology and the 
country’s revisionist tendencies in education and diplomacy. Many audiences were 
sympathetic to this belated outrage, and new scholarship concerning the event and its 
aftermath became increasingly common. In this context, the public memory 
reconstruction of the U.S., China, and Japan gained an international audience as each 
country asserted new interpretations of the events and furthered selected historical 
narratives. China began to present a narrative of victimhood in a forgotten Holocaust and 
one that is arguably worse, given its unspoken, unrecognized nature. Consequently, Japan 
became perceived as a revisionist aggressor, capable of shocking atrocities and unwilling 
to address its own dark wartime memories. The victim-aggressor narratives debated 
between China and Japan provided the U.S. with the role of “objective” witness, 
protector of the “truth,” and qualified arbiter.     
 As a result of the shifting tides of geopolitics, Nanking Atrocity memories are 
complex and dynamic and are affected by shifting economic concerns, political agendas, 
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and cultural misconceptions. Memory carries an individual and national importance, 
allowing for both personal and public reconciliation of tragedy. However, as the evolving 
and contested nature of valid, ethical Nanking commemoration demonstrates, the 
collectivization and politicization of memory reshapes historical understandings and thus 
implicates international relations. The staggering variety of “official” Nanking narratives 
reveals the manipulation of these tragic memories for evolving political aspirations and 
has undermined the stability of national identities. The current international disputes 
between China and Japan, with the U.S. as a self-elected mediator, signify the 
consequences of public memory exploitation. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the 
factors that lead a nation to adopt public memory and construct historical narratives in 
order to overcome future obstacles in scholarship and international diplomacy.   
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Chapter I: Immediate Reactions and the Tokyo Tribunals 
Japan, similar to Germany, was involved in international trials for crimes 
committed during World War II. The Japanese parallel of the Nuremberg Trials, the 
International Military Tribunals for the Far East (IMFTE), commenced on May 3rd, 1946. 
The rulings concerning the Nanking Atrocity became the preeminent topic of the trials as 
Chinese victims and Japanese defendants testified in court. In his section of Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi’s collected scholarship, Timothy Brook reveals the ways in which the 
adjudication of the Nanking Atrocity at the trials began to concretize selected 
interpretations of the incident:  
China regarded the incident as the most atrocious event of the war and highlighted 
the brutalities at Nanking among the cases that it submitted to the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) between 1944 and 1946. The United 
States….had a different concern, which was to use the incident as a linchpin for its 
argument that the leaders of Japan conspired to commit war crimes throughout the 
region and throughout the war. As a consequence of this double interest, two 
Japanese were convicted as A-class war criminals and executed for ‘crimes against 
peace.’2     
The Tokyo Tribunals provided these three nations the opportunity to formalize their 
perceptions of Japan’s actions. As Takashi Yoshida notes in, “Wartime Accounts of the 
Nanking Atrocity,” the responses to the Nanking Atrocity during the war were far 
removed from the immediate post-war reflections of the Tokyo Tribunals. Generally, 
Chinese officials and civilians alike had looked past the atrocities committed in Nanking 
during the war as only a single example of greater aggressions at the time; similarly, in 
                                                             
2 Timothy Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking: The Tokyo Judgement and the Guilt of 
History,” in The Nanking Atrocity 1937-38: Complicating the Picture, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 149. 
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the midst of war, the majority of Japanese society had not fully contemplated the nature 
of the crimes committed at Nanking but celebrated each victory against the Chinese.3 
Therefore, the trials serve as an important landmark in the construction of Nanking 
Atrocity memory. However, although the committees at the tribunals reached a 
conclusive ruling that found twenty-five Japanese defendants guilty of various crimes 
and, more symbolically significant, sentenced seven Japanese officials to death, there 
existed competing persuasive forces and procedural failings at the trials which would 
later influence the formation of competing wartime memories.     
 While the Tokyo Tribunals are often considered to be the parallel for Germany’s 
Nuremberg trials, there are several key distinctions between the two legal proceedings. 
As Brook notes in his writing, the temporal contextualization of the tribunals was 
significant: “Unlike Nuremberg, which judged German leaders expeditiously, Tokyo 
dragged on for two and a half years. More to the point, Tokyo fell under the shadow of 
the Cold War, trying to dispense justice after the political alignments that had enabled it 
to be convened, had dissolved.”4 The proceedings of the trials, in which truths of a past 
historical period were decided, coincided with the coming of a new historical milieu—the 
Cold War. As adjudicators become temporally separated from the Atrocity, memories 
and interpretations of the event became imbued with the social concerns of new political 
realities. The rulings of the Tokyo Tribunals are therefore inextricable from the historical 
                                                             
3 Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity,” in The Nanking Atrocity 1937-38: 
Complicating the Picture, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 257. 
4 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 150. 
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context in which they were decided. Furthermore, there were significant evidential issues 
present in the tribunal proceedings:  
The principle source on which the prosecution relied for evidence regarding the 
Rape of Nanking was Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. The sixty-nine 
documents in these books were generated by the German and American members of 
the International Committee (IC) for the Nanking Safety Zone (NSZ). During the 
first two months of the Japanese occupation, the IC sought to secure the safety of the 
Chinese population in Nanking. The books were published in 1939 and distributed 
worldwide in the hope of stimulating international support for China’s struggles 
against Japan. The effort would yield unexpected results after the war, for 
substantial portions of the books were read directly into the war crimes record. The 
prosecution solicited additional evidence from some of the American members of 
the IC, who were asked to testify, either in person or by written affidavit, about what 
they knew and experienced. The court’s reliance on their testimony meant that the 
IC was pivotal in shaping the tribunal’s perception of Japanese conduct during the 
capture of Nanking. The bench’s reconstruction of the event in its final judgements 
closely follows that account.5     
The court’s elevated legal valuation of the IC transcripts as a primary source of 
evidence reveals the gradual formation of perpetuated narratives of American 
intervention. The observations of expats living in Nanking at the time of the Japanese 
occupation, including the words of now-celebrated notables such as Minnie Vautrin and 
John Rabe, were compiled and disseminated for the clear purpose of gaining sympathy 
for China’s sufferings and encouraging international intervention. These figures have 
become cemented in modern Nanking memory as martyrs and heroes for their actions. 
While the sincerity of their efforts is not contested, there remains a significant obstacle in 
accepting these observations as unbiased, well-informed, and viable for legal usage.  
 Tensions regarding the court’s decision are exemplified in the dissent of 
Radhabinod Pal. Although there were four tribunal members who opposed the majority 
                                                             
5 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 152. 
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ruling, Pal’s dissent is the most commonly referenced and evoked in Nanking Atrocity 
debates. Pal rejected the tribunal proceedings, arguing that “the guilt adhered not to the 
individuals who stood before the bench but to history, specifically the history of Western 
imperialism in Asia. Until that legacy was resolved, Western nations had no authority to 
hold Japan responsible for evils committed during the war.”6 Pal viewed the trials as 
representative of a grander international power struggle that the U.S. was unqualified to 
adjudicate. It is important to note that, Pal, the main dissenter in the Tribunal’s ruling, 
was invited to serve as a representative of India; Brook implies that this was a symbolic 
gesture, as Pal and others invited to serve were victims of Japanese aggression and 
imperialism and therefore, theoretically, shared a common perspective.7 However, 
despite this potential empathy for the Chinese victims of Japanese imperialist aggression, 
Pal could not justify the tribunal proceedings, which he considered to be little more than 
one-sided victor’s justice. For, while Pal recognized the reality of Japan’s brutality and 
the actuality of the event, he was “disturbed by the retrospective moral uses to which the 
prosecution put the event, prompting him to decline to capitalize ‘rape’ and to install the 
word in scare quotes when he used it. He preferred to speak in terms of ‘the Nanking 
Incident.’”8 Thus, Pal’s dissent against the majority rulings are inextricably linked to his 
condemnation of China and the United States’ ends-justify-means memory 
reconstruction. Pal refused to agree with a sentencing that sought to draw a continuous 
thread among and serve as a blanket charge for Japan’s historical aggressions. Pal, 
                                                             
6 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 150. 
7 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 158. 
8 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 159. 
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therefore, separated from the majority opinion on the grounds that Japan’s actions in 
Nanking could not necessarily be tied to official imperial orders in Japan and could not 
be considered the catalyst for other atrocities committed subsequently:    
The Rape of Nanking was thus installed as the moment of origin for a long series of 
‘similar atrocities’ stretching across Southeast Asia and into the Pacific. The 
continuity that the prosecution alleged between Nanking and subsequent Japanese 
war crimes proved that misdeeds were consistent and so must have emanated 
conspiratorially from the central government. The underlying goal of the American-
dominated prosecution in arguing for the continuity, Pal believed, was to identify the 
mistreatment of American servicemen in the Pacific as being of the same category as 
the brutalization of Nanking residents.9 
Although the motivations behind Pal’s dissent are similarly questioned, his distrust 
of the court’s rulings and the implications of these official, constructed Nanking Atrocity 
perceptions are not ungrounded. The ultimate success of the Tokyo Tribunals has become 
highly debated in recent years, as Brook notes:  
Scholarly assessments since the 1970s have wondered whether Tokyo achieved 
anything more than victors’ justice. This sense of disrepute has led popular writers 
more recently to continue dismantling the Tokyo judgement, though by arguing in 
quite the other direction: not that the postwar victors’ judgements on Japan were too 
harsh, but that they were too weak; that Japan has still to bear its ‘legal burden,’ 
particularly for what happened in Nanking.10  
Even such commonly referenced sources as the History Channel echo this sense of 
doubt, both in the American agenda and the lingering impressions of the trial, noting that 
“Some observers thought that Emperor Hirohito should have been tried for his tacit 
approval of Japanese policy during the war, but he was protected by U.S. authorities who 
saw him as a symbol of Japanese unity and conservatism, both favorable traits in the 
                                                             
9 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 164. 
10 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 150. 
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postwar U.S. view.”11 From scholarly investigation to the most accessible online sources, 
uncertainty and inconclusiveness regarding the Tokyo outcomes is perpetuated. This 
sense of lingering reservation is perhaps the most significant distinction between the 
Nuremberg trials and the Tokyo Tribunals; while each platform allowed for the 
delegation of responsibility and blame and for the construction of official memory, the 
Tokyo Tribunals did not result in any long-term, meaningful reparations.   
 The effects of this doubt are evident in the instability of Nanking Atrocity 
memories. As Fujiwara Akira states in “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive 
Overview” and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi notes in “The Messiness of Historical 
Reality,” the trial findings, including death tolls and agreements over monetary 
reparations, were formally agreed upon by both China and Japan through the signing of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty: “Indeed, the Japanese text enjoins accepting the trials 
(saiban) as valid and binding.”12 For many decades after the war, there was relatively 
little debate between nations about appropriate Nanking memory. In his essay, 
Wakabayashi posits that the reasoning for this lack of reflection stemmed from the desire 
to divert attention away from domestic issues in China:       
For classes branded ‘the black five antirevolutionaries’—capitalists, landlords, 
intellectuals, criminals, and KMT (right-wing) sympathizers—those other problems 
[Cultural Revolution, Great Leap Forward, the Great Famine] were certainly more 
recent than Japanese aggression and probably more painful too. Even females who 
had been raped or recruited in the war as ‘comfort women’ suffered persecution for 
allegedly consorting with the enemy. Thus, for more than thirty years after the war, 
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but especially in the PRC, directed most 
of their wrath at ‘traitors to the Han race’ and class enemies—at other Chinese rather 
                                                             
11 “May 3rd: 1946, Japanese War Crimes Trial Begin,” History Channel, accessed March 1st, 2018, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japanese-war-crimes-trial-begins.  
12 Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” in The Nanking Atrocity 1937-38: 
Complicating the Picture, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 8. 
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than at the Japanese. Terrible though it was, as massacres go in history, Nanking had 
been largely forgotten.13     
During these early post-war years, China had not yet collectivized and politicized 
Nanking memory in the pursuit of a unifying national identity. Rather, domestic power 
struggles focused attention inward, and the atrocities committed by Japan were largely 
overlooked by official groups. For those of whom the recollections of pain were still 
fresh—for instance, the forced sex slaves known as “comfort women”—there were few 
outlets to gain sympathy or reparation. Thus, in the early post-war years, the Atrocity was 
approached without the animosity that is a marked feature of modern Sino-Japanese 
debates. As Wakabayashi discusses in his essay, initial reflections on the incident 
revealed almost a shared sense of victimhood: “Both regimes [PRC and KMT] presumed 
that Japanese militarism had been hateful, but voiced little overt criticism on the grounds 
that ordinary Japanese, like ordinary Chinese, had been its victims.”14 International 
perceptions of the major involved countries were complex given Japan’s own losses in 
World War II and the United States’ own acts of war crimes. In his article, “The Nanking 
Atrocity and Chinese Historical Memory,” Joshua A. Fogel echoes arguments presented 
by Wakabayashi that even the perception of America as the heroic interventionist nation 
were not immediately adopted. Rather, and in stark contrast, the Chinese government 
perpetuated an intentionally negative image of America and the nation’s involvement 
during the Nanking Atrocity:         
….the PRC has always hampered serious scholarship on history in order to control 
the interpretation of it. The PRC government also strategically exploits history 
                                                             
13 Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” 4. 
14 Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” 4. 
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against international enemies, and deploys it to inspire shame in potential trading 
partners. For example, it used the Atrocity as an ideological, albeit irrational, anti-
U.S. surrogate during the Korean War. In 1952, the PRC regime tried to implicate 
Americans in the Atrocity by claiming that the International Committee (IC)—an 
organization of Westerners who actually saved many thousands of Chinese civilians 
in the Nanking Safety Zone (NSZ)—was a gang of Western imperialists complicit 
with the Japanese invaders. The PRC would again use the Atrocity during the 1960s 
to criticize the U.S. role in building up bases in Japan.15   
This depiction of American involvement is corroborated in Wakabayashi’s essay, 
as well, which reads,           
The PRC in the 1950s also insinuated complicity by U.S. residents in Nanking who 
reputedly ‘entertained themselves with beef, roast duck, sweet potatoes and other 
fresh food’ while the invaders ran amok. The PRC also accused U.S. residents of 
creating a refugee area, the Nanking Safety Zone (NSZ), so that Chinese could be 
more easily killed. Today, a different PRC line depicts those same Americans, plus 
Nazi Party member and ‘good German’ John Rabe, as heroic friends of China who 
rescued Nanking citizens from slaughter.16     
   
While such key Nanking texts like Chang’s The Rape of Nanking famously 
celebrate the Western protection of innocent Chinese against Japanese invaders, thereby 
popularizing this narrative of involvement, history reveals more complicated, dynamic, 
and inconsistent representations throughout the post-war decades. Brook asserts the 
implications of these complex Nanking memories in his article, arguing that these 
memories have ultimately been more detrimental than beneficial to each society in 
overcoming historical differences. Rather than attempt to bridge identification separations 
between groups, Brook argues that these instances of denial or vengeance “‘thicken’ 
conceptions of who they are by packing the event with particularized cultural identities 
                                                             
15 Joshua A. Fogel, “The Nanking Atrocity and Chinese Historical Memory,” in The Nanking Atrocity 
1937-38: Complicating the Picture, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 
260. 
16 Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” 4. 
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and exclusive collective memories through which they can honor themselves and disdain 
others. These are unilateral histories, not histories of reconciliation.”17 In order for 
memory to serve its proponents, Brook argues, it must be reflective of a more collective 
interpretation of events.         
 While the validity or historical accuracy of these representations is not the subject 
of this project, the construction of collective memory and the factors that influenced the 
process of remembering this event are. Each nation’s individual pursuit for a concrete, 
inviolable wartime memory demonstrates the fragility and vulnerability of historical 
consciousness. The fragmentation of Nanking memories and interpretations can be traced 
to the Tokyo Tribunals, which played a monumental role in the concretization of Atrocity 
narratives. However, these concretizations are inextricable from the historical context of 
the Tribunals. As the trials were temporally separated from the event, the rulings that 
secured Atrocity interpretations were imbued with the concerns of new political realities 
and historical junctures like the Cold War. The well-intentioned search for “truth” in 
Atrocity remembrance allows for the reconstruction of these memories, a process which 
is steeped in the context of historical differences and contemporary goals. These events 
are thus dislocated from the only context in which they were ever sanctified and have, 
consequently, become the symbolic placeholder for larger international debates.   
     
 
 
                                                             
17 Brook, “Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking,” 173. 
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Chapter II: Major Issues 
 This thesis does not aim to participate in the factual disputes regarding the 
Nanking Atrocity; an excess of scholarship is already devoted to the study of these 
elements, with little progress in the unification of international interpretations of the 
event. However, despite the obstacles posed by discussion of these factual issues, it is 
essential to establish a general understanding of the topics in order to analyze the 
rhetorical construction and reconstruction of Nanking memory. These foundational topics 
include naming of the event and death tolls. While contestation over death toll figures 
represents a battle over facts, the issue of naming reveals a more implicit argument about 
the nature of the Atrocity. Although these issues may initially appear minor, debates over 
death toll figures and proper referents dominate Nanking scholarship and have, 
unfortunately, resulted in increased tensions between China and Japan. Furthermore, the 
reality of Nanking scholarship is that debate over such fundamental factors as naming 
and fatalities often impedes reconciliation or more fruitful analysis of the event. Thus, 
examination of these topics provides insight as to the challenges of Nanking scholarship 
and demonstrates the ambiguity of Nanking memory.    
 As demonstrated in the previous chapter’s analysis of memory formation in the 
early post-war years, the various contributing elements in Nanking narratives are 
characterized by an openness to interpretation. An immediate issue posed by the lack of 
clarity and conclusiveness in the Tokyo Tribunals is as fundamental as the naming of the 
event; as a result of the varying Atrocity narratives presented at the trials, no singular 
term was ever used to address the event. The Nanking Atrocity is thus referred to by a 
15 
 
myriad of variations: the Rape of Nanking, the Nanking Incident, the Nanking Holocaust, 
the Nanking Atrocity, and the Nanking Massacre, to name a few. While the issue of 
naming may appear superficial in nature, there is an important rhetorical significance to 
the various ways in which the event is referred. Generally, different nomenclature for the 
event reflect ideological distinctions; the variety of terms that nations use to refer to the 
Atrocity reveals the variety of perceptions. For example, “Incident” is often considered to 
be reflective of a nation’s unrecognition of the event given the term’s generality. From 
the perspective of Chinese scholars, the Japanese use of this unspecific term implies an 
avoidance of the topic. However, “Incident” is not the only term used by the Japanese in 
reference to the Atrocity; other variations include the “Massive Butchery,” which has 
been adopted by some Japanese historians in order to denote the shockingly senseless 
brutality of Japanese soldiers.18 “Rape” is a term that highlights the rampant sexual abuse 
of Japanese troops against Chinese women; this term became widely popular 
internationally, as Akira notes, due to the Tokyo Tribunal focus on criminal treatment of 
civilians:     
….the ‘Rape of Nanking,’ as it was first called in 1937-38, became known the world 
over because of the huge number of rapes and mass murders committed against 
civilians. These atrocities took center stage at the Tokyo war crimes trials where 
Chinese victims and foreign witnesses testified, and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) emphasizes the issue today by seeking out ever more victims and witnesses. 
Thus, crimes against the general civilian population remains the key point in the 
debate over Nanking.19  
                                                             
18 Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” 4. 
19 Fujiwara Akira, “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview,” in The Nanking Atrocity 1937-38: 
Complicating the Picture, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 47. 
16 
 
The term “Rape of Nanking” both establishes and perpetuates a standard memory 
of the event by prioritizing atrocities committed against innocent civilians. As noted in 
Chapter I, tribunal committee member Radhabinod Pal rejected this politicized naming, 
instead choosing to refer to the events as the “Nanking Incident.” However, despite his 
efforts to adopt a more politically-neutral form of naming, “Incident” has itself become 
generally recognized as a revisionist form of address. Therefore, despite his intentions, 
Pal’s lexical choice has only further contributed to the rhetorical memory of the event and 
its current presentations. An even more obviously rhetorical framing of the event is 
constructed through the use of the term “holocaust.” Popularized by Chang’s The Rape of 
Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, the sensitive nature of this form of 
address has exacerbated the tensions surrounding Atrocity debates. Wakabayashi 
examines the historical usage of the term “Holocaust” and the rhetorical influences that 
led to its appropriation: 
Only in the 1970s did ‘holocaust’—which, with a small h, had generically denoted 
calamities involving fire—become ‘the Holocaust’….‘The Holocaust’ became a 
template for ‘the Ta-t’u’-sha’—also upper cased with a definite article—standing for 
the Nanking Atrocity, and by extension, for Japanese war crimes in China that 
demand post hoc individual compensation.20      
As with “Rape,” “Holocaust” denotes a specific political interpretation of the events. The 
use of this term in reference to the Nanking Atrocity illustrates a larger argument that not 
only posits a genocidal element to the Nanking murders but also elevates the cross-
cultural significance of the events to that of the Holocaust. Patrizia Violi notes the 
rhetorical significance of these various forms of address in her article, “Educating for 
                                                             
20 Wakabayashi, “The Messiness of Historical Reality,” 6. 
17 
 
Nationhood: A Semiotic Reading of the Memorial Hall for Victims of the Nanking 
Massacre by Japanese Invaders,” claiming that “Lexical choice is obviously an important 
way of categorizing the event and transmitting conceptions of it.”21 The highly politicized 
and rhetorical nature of the naming of the Nanking Atrocity demonstrates the complexity 
of the topic and remains a substantial, if comparatively superficial, element in Nanking 
debates.          
 Perhaps the most common and most symbolic topic in Nanking scholarship and 
debate is the issue of death tolls. Since the Nanking Atrocity was situated in the grander 
context of the Second Sino-Japanese war, there remains difficulty in determining an 
accurate death toll estimate. Although a death toll was initially established and agreed 
upon by involved nations at the Tokyo Tribunals, the figure has been a topic of 
contention between Japan and China since the 1980s with little in the way of new, fruitful 
scholarship. The renewed interest in the death toll figures in China and Japan has 
stemmed in part from the lack of clarity regarding important distinctions. For instance, 
the Tokyo Tribunals failed to set in clear, unambiguous terms, whether the death toll 
estimate includes non-civilians. In the 1980s, Japanese revisionist textbooks referred to 
the event as an “illusion,” given the lack of clear source material to corroborate Chinese 
claims and figures. In response, the PRC issued statements denouncing this inadmission 
of wrongdoing and asserting a new death toll that exceeded the previously agreed upon 
figure of 200,000 to 300,000 casualties over the course of a five-month period temporally 
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and stretching geographically from Shanghai to Nanking; here, Wakabayashi argues, 
“The tacit distinction between ‘death tolls’ and ‘massacre-victim tolls’ disappeared, so 
that ‘over 300,000’ now stood for nonbelligerents murdered in the city and excluded 
troops killed in action from Shanghai to Nanking in August to December.”22 This new 
representation of death toll figures led to an onslaught of international debate between 
China and Japan as scholars and non-scholars alike contributed what they considered to 
be the more accurate assessment of Chinese fatalities. From an outside perspective, this 
shift in the Chinese manner of conceptualizing the death toll (from including soldiers to 
representing solely civilian deaths) reveals the vagueness of the original figures and 
presents important questions regarding the assessment of damages to human life: should 
the death toll estimates include non-civilians? Furthermore, how many Chinese soldiers 
died on active duty, and how many POW soldiers were killed? In response to such 
questions, investigation during the trials and scholarship in the following decades have 
sought to locate exactly Japanese Imperial Army orders or definitions of “POW.”  
Although Akira finds clear evidence that Japanese soldiers knowingly violated 
international codes of POW treatment, there are additional factors that impact perceptions 
of the death toll debate, such as the crucial delineating factor of geographical and 
temporal boundaries. The death toll figures are often contested because temporal and 
geographical boundaries for the incident were never formally established. Although the 
Atrocity is considered the Nanking Atrocity, death toll estimates increase and decrease 
depending on whether similar atrocities in neighboring villages are considered and 
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whether the pre-occupation casualties are considered.   
 Furthermore, many contest the death figures on the grounds that not all damages 
can be attributed to the Japanese invaders. For instance, there were crimes committed 
internally between Chinese groups: “Even the leftist Kasahara Tokushi admits that T’ang 
Sheng-chih, the Chinese commander at Nanking, ordered some of his units to shoot and 
kill others that tried to flee. Deniers also cite pro-Chinese wartime Western journalists 
who reported that much of the death and carnage had resulted from Chinese earth-
scorching and dyke blasting tactics, or from KMT rapacity that caused mass starvation.”23 
Even less commonly analyzed are the Chinese civilian deaths that can be attributed to 
Americans: “….severe collateral damage resulted from U.S. air raids on Japanese targets 
in Chinese cities, the worst of which was in December 1944,when eighty-four B-29s 
indiscriminately attacked Hankow with incendiary bombs, causing fires that lasted three 
days.”24 From these factors, it is clear that the international debate concerning death toll 
figures is, in many ways, futile. The lack of attention paid to the various instances of 
American- or Chinese-caused fatalities during the period reflects a disinterest in the 
“truth” beyond the value of perpetuating a symbolic argument. Although there is value to 
determining a realistic death toll, this topic is often used as a shorthand in or an 
introduction to debates about the larger issues of the Atrocity. Furthermore, arguments 
over death tolls have been notorious by groups that use this issue symbolically in order to 
assert a hierarchy of suffering in WWII history. By arguing for the upward revision of 
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previously-established death tolls, these groups attempt to fortify beyond any 
counterargument China’s victim status. While China certainly was victimized during 
WWII, the main proponents of death toll arguments often undermine real scholarly 
efforts to determine the number of fatalities, thus demonstrating the symbolic nature of 
this topic in many Atrocity debates.         
 The issues of naming and death tolls reflect the general ambiguity and 
inconclusiveness in understandings of the Nanking Atrocity. Given the fundamental 
nature of these topics within the larger context of Atrocity debates, it is important to 
recognize not only the complexity of these issues but their lack of transparency and 
scholarship as well. The rhetorical implementation of these various sub-arguments 
demonstrates the seemingly symbolic quality of many Nanking disagreements as well as 
inconsistency and instability in the foundations of Nanking Atrocity memory. 
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Chapter III: Wartime Reporting and Journalistic Interpretations 
 In the evaluation of Atrocity memory construction, wartime reporting plays an 
invaluable role. Wartime reporting, like contemporary memorializations of the events, 
presents purposive interpretations of the Nanking Atrocity. Furthermore, changes in 
journalistic depictions of Japanese actions reflect the shifts in national and political goals, 
just as the later shifts in Nanking memory formation represent the flux of international 
relations. However, unlike the later platforms for Nanking memory construction, wartime 
reporting reflects the evolving goals of each nation concurrent with the unfolding of the 
events. These interpretations are cemented in history and can serve as reference points for 
the modern interpretations of the Nanking Atrocity and in in the examination of the ways 
in which national goals have influenced the development of Atrocity memory. 
 Throughout the course of the war, Chinese, U.S., and Japanese coverage of the 
events evolved. The Japanese invasion of major Chinese cities pushed news outlets into 
the mainland. With this diffusion of the country’s foremost reporters and the destruction 
of resources, the accessibility of information about Japanese actions decreased. So 
dislocated from reliable wartime coverage, the journalist’ developing understandings of 
the war led to shifting public perceptions of Japanese aggressions. In some instances, 
Western reports and English-language news outlets covered Japanese atrocities in greater 
detail than their Chinese counterparts. Consequently, Japanese, Chinese, and Western 
domestic reports of the war were responsive to outside, international publications 
detailing the events: Chinese journalists responded to Western and Japanese reports; 
Japan responded to Western and Chinese reports; Western reports responded to Chinese 
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and Japanese publications. Thus, in order to comprehend the evolution of Atrocity 
perceptions, the development of wartime interpretations of Japanese actions, documented 
through journalistic reports, must be examined internally for each country and within the 
larger context of international coverage.        
 Even though war time reporting does not reflect Nanking “memories” so much as 
the immediate international responses to the events, these sources became instrumental in 
later memory construction and critical analysis. In his section of Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi’s text, Takashi Yoshida argues that an important component of Nanking 
denial is the observation that “the Western media in 1937-38 rarely mentioned Japanese 
misdeeds at Nanking….In sum, the argument goes, there is no documented proof of a 
Nanking Atrocity that dates from the wartime era when it reputedly took place; therefore, 
the event never really occurred.”25 Clearly, the nature of wartime Nanking coverage is 
influential to the modern debates regarding the events. However, as Yoshida notes, there 
are journalistic records that prove not only that the Atrocity occurred, but that each 
country reported on the events contemporaneously. Although it may seem unnecessary to 
highlight that wartime reporting proves (with some margins of error) the actuality of the 
Atrocity, this is an important recognition given modern Nanking denial within sects of 
Japanese society.           
 Furthermore, these journalistic interpretations of the events, as Yoshida argues, 
share another important commonality—the reflection of political and social aspirations: 
“During the Asia-Pacific War of 1931-45, ethnocentrism, nationalism, national interests, 
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and demonization of the enemy heavily influenced American, Chinese, and Japanese 
views of atrocities in Nanking.”26 Western and Asian wartime reporting demonstrate that 
the collectivization of memory is goal-oriented in nature and that these narratives are 
constructed using preexisting interpretive templates of political or social values. Thus, 
from these journalistic representations of the Nanking Atrocity, later cultural devices 
such as textbooks, monuments, films, and literature found material for their own 
remembering of the wartime period, thereby demonstrating the transmissive and 
accumulative nature of memory construction. The implications of these early stages of 
memory formation cannot be undermined, as these “shared” experiences become the 
foundations of national identity, wielded to justify the consequences of political 
aspirations and the manifestations of nationalism.  
Chinese Wartime Reporting: 
Despite Japanese claims about the lack of official, un-biased coverage of the events 
in Nanking, there is evidence of regular Chinese reporting during the period, although 
these reports differ significantly from later interpretations of the war. As Parks Coble 
notes in his article, “The Legacy of China’s Wartime Reporting, 1937-1945: Can the Past 
serve the Present?,” the invasion of Japanese forces created a national drive for 
journalistic coverage even despite logistical setbacks: 
Japan’s invasion of China in the summer of 1937 initially dealt a devastating blow to 
China’s publishing industry. Not only were facilities destroyed, but the Japanese 
occupation of coastal China forced most writers and publishers inland….Yet the war 
stimulated public demand for news. Despite all of the destruction and disruption, 
journals and newspapers continued to be published, often from temporary locations 
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as Chinese forces retreated. The public’s thirst for war coverage elevated the war 
correspondent to the peak of the journalistic profession. Even heretofore literary 
figures began to turn to wartime reporting and propaganda work during the national 
crisis.27 
 From the early years of the Second-Sino Japanese war, then, journalism was an 
invaluable resource in educating the Chinese public about Japanese actions and beginning 
to formalize perception of the unfolding events. Yoshida references regional newspapers 
like the Hankow Ta-kung-pao, which began publishing details of the Japanese approach 
as early as the autumn of 1937,28 demonstrating the pervasiveness of war coverage. 
Significantly, this journalistic overage existed despite the fragmented nature of China’s 
political sphere: there is evidence of both KMT and Communist Party wartime reporting, 
even specifically of the Nanking Atrocity: “On 10 March 1938, the KMT regime 
broadcast in Japanese a report entitled, ‘Barbaric Acts by the Imperial Army’ that more 
or less repeated the Hankow Ta-kung-pao reports….One of the earliest Chinese citations 
of the Nanking Atrocity appeared in a CCP weekly published at Hankow, the Ch’un-
chung, dated 1 January 1938. It reported, though in a highly garbled fashion, the 100-man 
killing contest….”29 With the progressing movement of Japanese forces into major 
Chinese territories, this journalistic coverage provided crucial information to the public. 
However, this coverage has a greater significance to contemporary debates about the 
Nanking Atrocity than its role as proof of the existence of Japanese cruelties; wartime 
reports of the Nanking Atrocity present a departure from the more widely-known 
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interpretations of Iris Chang or other leading figures in modern Nanking memory revival. 
China’s wartime interpretations of Japanese atrocities present a heroic narrative of 
resistance rather than the tales of Chinese victimization that dominate contemporary 
reflections. In order to better assess the complexities of modern Nanking scholarship and 
debates, it is important to examine the war-era representations of the Nanking Atrocity.  
 The nature of Chinese wartime reporting can be understood as the product of two 
national goals: to maintain morale in the long, brutal onslaught of Japan’s invasion, 
against which Chinese forces struggled to maintain ground, and to encourage 
increasingly-necessary Western support and sympathy. The former goal was manifested 
through a “victor” or “hero” narrative that existed in the early postwar years but is all but 
nonexistent in modern representations of the Nanking Atrocity. The latter goal shares 
comparatively more similarities with modern representations of the events and must be 
examined in the context of Western wartime depictions of Japanese actions.   
 To maintain the narrative of a heroic resistance, Chinese wartime reporters 
shouldered the burden of not only informing the public but serving as a propagandistic 
tool as well. The strategies used to achieve both goals simultaneously is worthy of further 
scholarship, as the optimistic spin on wartime efforts became increasingly difficult as 
Chinese forces suffered a mostly-unbroken stream of military setbacks in these years. As 
Coble examines in his article, this responsibility led most publications to assert the 
prowess of the Chinese military and the resilience of the country in the wake of Japanese 
cruelty.30 In his article, Coble references two publications, Kangzhan sanrikan (The War 
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of Resistance Semiweekly) and Nahan (War Cry), both of which framed coverage of 
Japanese advances within portrayals of China’s heroic and continuous resistance.31 These 
journals, created with the intent of commending the country’s wartime spirit, demonstrate 
national recognition of the need for public optimism. Furthermore, as Coble argues, this 
journalistic optimism was not always ungrounded:  
The peak of the heroic resistance approach came with China’s victory at 
Taierzhuang (Shangdong). After months of losses and retreats, a genuine battlefield 
win breathed new life into Chinese reporting on the war….Taierzhuang was thus a 
genuine psychological boost for those who had been trying to put the best possible 
spin on China’s earlier setbacks. The Chinese press had established ‘heroic 
resistance’ as the dominant narrative in the treatment of the war and now there was 
an actual battlefield victory. Even as Chinese forces retreated (Taierzhuang proved a 
very temporary success), the press tried to put the news in a positive light. ‘Long-
term resistance’ became the new battle cry.32 
 It is possible that the Chinese success at Taierzhuang can, to some degree, be 
attributed to the constant production of uplifting wartime coverage. However, from a 
modern perspective, this optimism is complicated by the long-term militaristic success of 
Japanese forces in China. As Chinese forces continued to retreat, the logic of presenting 
militaristic setbacks as victories, or at least in imbuing these retreats with a sense of 
unconquerability, lessened dramatically. Coble reconciles this consistent and somewhat 
misleading positive representation of events and China’s continued retreat, arguing that 
this journalistic framing was not altogether undeserved: 
It might seem odd that Chinese writers would try to portray the early war era as a 
‘victory’ in the face of the long retreat. Yet there was more to this stance than simply 
the need to keep up morale. Many believed that despite the costs, fighting back was 
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a major step for China, especially when viewed against the nonresistance policy 
following Japan’s seizure of the northeast in September 1931.33 
 Given the history of Sino-Japanese conflict, China’s pursuit of resistance might 
therefore justify the extent of wartime optimism. This wartime spin of Chinese 
militaristic must then, like so many other facets of the Nanking Atrocity issue, be viewed 
in the larger historical context of Chinese-Japanese relations. Removed from the context 
of Japan’s occupation and China’s political fragmentation, the wartime reporting of 
Japan’s aggression may appear to misrepresent and distort Chinese losses to the public; in 
the light of these factors, though, China’s attempt to hold any ground against the Japanese 
forces can be viewed as an important historical moment. While Coble presents a strong 
argument for the justification of misleadingly positive reports, this notion of self-
congratulation does not explain the proliferation and intentional persistence of Chinese 
narratives of victory. From the perspective of modern Nanking debates, this type of 
reporting, pervasive even during the Atrocity itself, problematizes the Chinese arguments 
about the shared national pain resulting from the specific event. If events like the Atrocity 
were overlooked or minimized in the pursuit of morale-boosting journalism, then the 
general recognition of the event and resulting widespread, collective suffering during the 
wartime era is contestable.        
 Ultimately, as Yoshida notes, Chinese reporting during the Second Sino-Japanese 
war did not differ in any significant manner from the nationalistic wartime reporting of 
other involved countries. Chinese publications can be problematized in the context of 
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modern debates but were not far removed from the goal-oriented journalism of Japan and 
the U.S. As Yoshida argues,    
The tone of these Chinese reports was little different from wartime patriotic news 
accounts in other nations. These reports uncritically supported China’s military and 
political leaders, while cheering the deaths of Japanese troops and denouncing 
Japanese atrocities. On 17 December, the first reports of random Japanese killings 
and arson began to appear. Then, on the twenty-fifth, the press confirmed the 
previous report of Japanese atrocities in Nanking, including rape and looting; it 
estimated that 50,000 male refugees under forty years of age had been slaughtered 
after the city had fallen. This Chinese news writer stressed that Japanese atrocities in 
Nanking had produced outrage not only in China, but also abroad; and he also 
pointed out the hypocrisy of the Japanese government, which bore guilt for killing 
tens of thousands of innocent Chinese civilians while claiming to fight to establish 
eternal peace in East Asia.34  
 Despite the inconsistencies that Chinese wartime journalism pose to modern 
Nanking Atrocity debates for its depictions of heroism and resilience in the face of 
Japanese victories, this manner of reporting is not specific to China. Regardless of the 
wartime logic of China’s optimistic reporting, this “heroic resistance” narrative 
demonstrates the evolution of Chinese interpretations of the Nanking Atrocity. 
Furthermore, China’s international discussions concerning the event in the wartime era 
reveal another significant development in Chinese Atrocity representations.   
 As previously mentioned, a crucial, secondary goal of Chinese reporting was to 
garner international sympathy and support. As the benefits of optimistic reporting 
diminished and Chinese losses increased, international aid became necessary to China’s 
victory. Yoshida examines this distinction between domestic Chinese reporting and 
international presentations of the Atrocity, stating, 
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In wartime China, the KMT government did not regard the outrage in Nanking as 
the symbol of Japanese wartime cruelty, as the postwar People’s Republic has come 
to do. Instead, Chinese thought of Nanking as but one of innumerable Japanese 
atrocities in China at the time. Although Chinese delegates to the League of Nations 
did mention Nanking explicitly in protesting Japanese war crimes, they chose to 
emphasize Japan’s use of chemical weapons and air raids on open cities because 
these types of atrocities, they reckoned, would more likely win world sympathy and 
aid.35  
 The impacts of this concern for Western aid are less apparent at the general-
public level than at the higher-level of Chinese delegates who would have had the 
opportunity to speak before Western officials; in an effort to gain Western 
sympathy without creating domestic distress over Japanese advances, most Chinese 
reports continued to discuss the acts of aggression through the lens of continued 
resilience: 
Apart from arousing Chinese sentiment, Chinese writers sought to gain sympathy for 
China’s cause overseas by widely publicizing Japanese atrocities. Within China 
itself, however, most of the Salvationist writers always tied reports of victimhood 
with the call for continued resistance. These writers did not want to stress China’s 
helplessness before the Japanese onslaught. This approach is evident in some of the 
early descriptions of the Rape of Nanjing which appeared in the summer of 1938. 
The writer Liu Liangmo, for instance, published an article in the June 29, 1938 issue 
of Kangzhan sanrikan entitled “Kuai ba gaoyang biancheng tie de duiwu” (Quickly 
take these lambs and make them into iron soldiers). The author, who was based in 
Changsha, was reacting to a detailed publication of Japanese atrocities issue by a 
local newspaper. He reprinted two photographs from the Rape of Nanjing….These 
images, no doubt new and shocking when first published, have since become so 
widely reproduced in photographic collections on Japanese atrocities in China as to 
become iconic. Indeed, Iris Chang reproduced both in her bestselling The Rape of 
Nanking. Chang supplies commentary for both which is actually very similar to the 
descriptions Liu had used in 1938.36  
As the Japanese invasion progressed and China’s militaristic defense faced 
increasing challenges, this secondary goal of securing Western attention was pursued 
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with greater urgency and depictions of heroic resistance gradually lessened.37 Thus, 
wartime reporting of the Nanking Atrocity differs from modern perceptions of the event 
not only in the sense that coverage generally depicted an optimistic Chinese 
perseverance, but that the general perception of the Atrocity was that, in the Chinese 
mentality, these events did not constitute the most noteworthy atrocity committed by the 
Japanese. This realization both exemplifies the extent of wartime horrors faced by the 
Chinese and problematizes the country’s later promotion of this event as the ultimate, 
undeniable symbol of Japanese imperialist aggression. As evidenced by her appropriation 
of the images earlier used by Liangmo, Chang reconstructs Nanking memory in a manner 
that overlooks China’s original perceptions of the event. Her title refers to the Atrocity as 
the forgotten Holocaust of WWII but fails to identify the role that China played in this 
forgetting. Although Chang uses the same material as Liangmo to forward her argument 
about Chinese victimization, she does not provide readers with the invaluable context and 
nature of the original Chinese arguments regarding the Nanking Atrocity. While Japanese 
revisionism deserves such denouncement, China’s own un-acknowledgement of the event 
should be examined as critically.       
 Furthermore, even when Chinese journalistic reports depicted Japanese cruelties, 
this presentation was not for the sake of unifying the Chinese public in a sense of 
victimization, as is the goal of modern reflections, but was rather accomplished in the 
pursuit of attracting Western aid. Usually, Chang-ian perceptions of Japanese brutality 
stemmed not from Chinese journalists but from Western writers and English-language 
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sources. As Yoshida notes, an English-language newspaper operating in Shanghai, the 
China Press, published reports following the Japanese invasion that emphasized the 
inhumanity of Japan’s actions and exacerbated preexisting views of Japanese society:   
These depredations in Nanking reinforced in the mind of this China Press writer 
images of Japanese lawlessness and barbarism that stemmed from earlier news 
reports of Japanese planes having bombed the USS Panay and HMS Ladybird and 
of having conducted indiscriminate air attacks on open cities such as Canton. 
Contemporaneous Chinese reports of Japanese depredations at Nanking thus 
reaffirmed and exacerbated earlier impressions of Japanese rapacity.38 
 Given the frenzy of WWII, it is impossible to extract perceptions of these 
domestic events from the wider context of international warfare. For the China Press 
writer, it is clear that the Japanese atrocities committed in Nanking only served to 
reaffirm existing perceptions of the nation. These early discussions of the Nanking 
Atrocity as presented in the China Press writings are, therefore, imbued with a tone of 
Western anti-Japanese sentiment. Capitalizing on negative U.S. perceptions of Japan 
became a guidepost for Chinese diplomacy during the Second Sino-Japanese war. In their 
effort to gain Western support, Chinese delegates emphasized issues that a U.S. audience 
could empathize with. These efforts and the influence of Western concerns are 
exemplified in the experiences of Wellington Koo, or Koo Wei-jun, first delegate for the 
Republic of China in the League of Council.39 Koo’s history of political roles deserves 
attention: he was the Chinese Minister to Mexico and the United States; he served as a 
delegate in the Paris Peace Conference; he was the Chinese Beiyang Government’s 
Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, interim premier, prime minister, and interim 
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president; he was the Chinese Ambassador to Britain and the United States; and he 
played an instrumental role in the formation of the League of Nations.40 In a 1938 
meeting, Koo “condemned Japan’s ‘cruel and barbarous conduct’ in Nanking and 
elsewhere” and “decried Japan’s indiscriminate bombings of open cities. His information 
about Nanking came from the New York Times by way of the Times of London, and he 
quoted from those reports to accuse the Japanese army” of its crimes.41   
 Significantly, Koo relied heavily on these Western journalistic sources to present 
his case. In addition to the New York Times article discussing the Nanking Atrocity, Koo 
also referenced “a separate article in the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post to estimate 
20,000 Chinese civilian deaths and assaults on thousands of women.”42 From this 
information, it is clear that there existed an interplay of Chinese and Western reporting. 
In his efforts to persuade Western delegates at the League Council meetings to support 
China, Koo relied on Western coverage of the Nanking Atrocity. As with the China Press 
articles, Koo’s reliance on these international discussions of the events presents issues. If 
Chinese journalists and officials must refer to Western media in their discussions of 
Japanese atrocities, then there exists a possibility of inaccuracy, if not biased 
misrepresentation, in these reports. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi examines this issue of 
Western-Chinese wartime reporting in his chapter, “The Nanking 100-Man Killing 
Contest Debate, 1971-75.” The 100-man killing contest represents a major topic in 
modern Nanking debates and is considered symbolic of the mindless excessiveness of 
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Japanese brutality. The 100-man killing contest was an important factor in the Tokyo 
Tribunal decisions and the excessive violence demonstrated in this event influenced 
rulings concerning Japanese culpability. However, the legitimacy of the issues is 
complicated by the fact that initial discussions of the event originated not in Chinese 
sources, but in Western coverage that responded to Japanese reports of the spree: 
 Chinese first learned of this ‘killing contest’ from English-language articles in the 
Japan Advertiser on 7 and 14 December 1937. Harold J. Timperley, an Australian 
reporter for the Manchester Guardian, reprinted these as ‘Appendix F: The Nanking 
‘Murder Race’ in his 1938 document collection, What War Means; and, further-
redacted accounts of the contest appeared in the 1 January 1938 issue of the China 
Weekly Review and other wartime Chinese publications, both Nationalist and 
Communist.43  
 While this manner of coverage may potentially benefit the range and immediacy 
of dissemination, this proliferation of information stemming from a singular, non-native 
source can pose issues of accuracy. As Wakabayashi notes, journalistic inaccuracies 
problematize the authenticity of this event and have led to debates between China and 
Japan about the punishment of the reported contest leaders: 
The Japan Advertiser articles—quoted by Timperley and circulated in China—held 
that a ‘murder race’ took place between Kuyung and Purple Mountain 
(Tzuchinshan). These articles would be crucial as evidence in executing Noda 
Tsuyoshi (not Takeshi or Iwao) and Mukai Toshiaki for war crimes at the NMT. In 
works still in print as of July 2006, the late Iris Chang, Erwin Wickert, Jonathan D. 
Spence, and others cite these articles as historically factual…..One defendant, Noda, 
protested that the contest never even took place. Instead, he said, reporters for the 
Tokyo nichi-nichi shinbun—which ran the original articles later translated and 
digested in the Japan Advertiser—fabricated the story after the other defendant, 
Mukai, had bragged about the imaginary feats. For his part, Mukai insisted that he 
never really killed anyone but boasted that he had, hoping the publicity would attract 
‘a better wife’ after he returned to Japan.44  
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 The Chinese understandings of the 100-man killing contest stemmed not from 
Chinese sources, or even from China-based Western reporters; this coverage stemmed 
from an English-language publication that derived its information from a single Japanese 
report. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in this chapter’s examination of Japanese 
wartime reporting, this publication operated under the same purpose of Chinese 
publications during the war era: glorifying and often overemphasizing national victories 
and to dehumanize the opponent. Consequently, the authenticity of these reports must be 
evaluated in the context of Japan’s nationalistic, goal-driven framing of journalistic 
coverage. Although Koo’s reliance on non-Chinese sources does not pose nearly the 
same challenges to modern Nanking debates as the 100-man killing contest reports do, it 
remains imperative in Nanking scholarship to examine the ways in which these initial 
depictions of Japanese aggressions were influenced by national goals and potentially 
subjected to factual inaccuracies.        
 Koo continued to decry Japanese aggressions despite the unreceptiveness of his 
League audience. He implored delegates to recognize the universal threat posed by 
Japanese success, arguing “that Japan was a threat not only to China, but also to the 
West.”45 However, as the years of the Second Sino-Japanese war continued, Koo’s efforts 
did not secure the intended economic aid from the League, a goal of even greater 
importance to Chinese officials than that of acquiring international outrage and empathy:  
 It was essential for Chinese government leaders not only to score moral points, but 
also to secure practical aid from a reluctant League. This is why they sent a cable 
prior to the assembly meeting that instructed Koo to take pains highlighting Japan’s 
inhumane assault. But they did so in the context of that day. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek 
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demanded that Koo tender a communique to the League Secretariat for circulation 
among member states in order to publicize as widely as possible Japan’s use of 
poison gas.46  
 As with contemporary discussions of the Nanking Atrocity, early Chinese 
assertions of Japanese aggression catered to a wider, international audience in the pursuit 
of support. Like Koo’s careful emphasis of Japan’s use of poison gas, Iris Chang’s 
construction of Nanking memory frames the event in a similarly rhetorical manner. In 
“The Nanking Atrocity and Chinese Historical Memory,” Fogel explains the potential 
motivation behind Chang’s choice in presentation: 
 ….the late Iris Chang….based her plea for international recognition of the Atrocity 
on what she presents as irrefutable numbers. She pointed out in an interview on 
American television—repeated in a San Francisco Chronicle interview—that the 
figure of 300,000 victims surpasses the combined death toll in the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki atomic bombings. Her implicit aim here is to establish a hierarchy of 
victimhood with China on top, especially because most Westerners cringe before the 
number of civilian lives lost in nuclear attacks on those Japanese cities [italics 
added]. But why not compare the death toll at Nanking with those of Stalingrad or 
Leningrad, where even more civilians were killed? The same moral hierarchy simply 
does not hold for Chang.47  
For Western audiences that had not yet discovered the brutality of Nazi Germany’s 
Holocaust and had not yet felt guilt for their nation’s own wartime atrocities, references 
to poison gas would have been the most accessible and impactful—as Yoshida notes, 
Western audiences would have, at the time, recalled recent “painful experiences” with 
poison gas from the Great War of 1914.48 Even then, China did not receive the aid Koo 
sought until the U.S. suffered its own national tragedy at the hands of Japanese 
aggressors in the form of Pearl Harbor. But for Chang’s era of Nanking remembering, 
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precisely targeted comparisons to the atomic bomb death tolls reflect stronger 
pathological appeals, enhancing the rhetorical strength of her argument. Thus, the appeals 
to Western sensibilities by Chang and Koo reveal a tactical shift but consistency in 
intention. Only with the eventual shifts in geopolitics, Yoshida argues, “did Nanking 
achieve unique status [as] the event that symbolized Japanese war crimes in China par 
excellence.”49          
 In the postwar narratives of Nanking memory, shifts in the perceived value of 
earlier journalistic coverage reflect the changing political tides in China. During the early 
postwar years, for example, the international aid so persistently pursued under Chiang 
Kai-shek’s guidance was later disregarded in the Maoist era: 
Contributions by Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist military or the United States 
and Britain were ignored during the Maoist period. Chiang’s stand at Shanghai in 
1947 or the role of the Flying Tigers was simply not part of the public discourse. 
When the war was discussed during the Maoist years, the ‘China as victor’ approach 
dominated.50  
 The news reports detailing Western intervention in Nanking or international 
militaristic or financial aid directly conflicted with the “heroic resistance” narrative of the 
Maoist era, which sought to eliminate evidence of Western influences from society. In 
order to mold wartime reports to fit more modern political goals and narratives, “today’s 
editors have to go beyond reprints in order to add more coverage of atrocities.”51 
However, these efforts to bypass the narrative limitations of China’s wartime journalism 
and focus more closely on the Nanking Atrocity as the symbol of Chinese patriotism and 
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Japanese aggression are problematic. Without concrete sources to support modern 
interpretations and relying only on memory to reconstruct Nanking narratives, writers are 
unable to present the past in a manner that is separate from contemporary beliefs and 
experiences. Coble recognizes this obstacle of modern Nanking remembrance, stating, 
“Anyone old enough to have lived through the war years and literate enough to have been 
a writer would also have lived through the traumas of the Maoist era….In trying to 
‘remember’ the war against Japan, writers of memoirs are looking through a prism of 
many later-life traumas.”52          
 Thus, a comparison of the war narratives presented in Chinese reporting and 
modern interpretations of the event demonstrates the evolution of Atrocity perceptions. 
As this section has demonstrated, the goals driving journalistic coverage shifted with the 
course of the war. However, whether the focus of these reports was to encourage public 
optimism and patriotism or to gain Western financial aid, the rhetorical nature of China’s 
wartime reporting remained a constant.  
Western/U.S. Wartime Reporting: 
In Nanking Atrocity narratives, the U.S. (with the assistance of other Western 
nationals) has been traditionally depicted as playing the role of a quiet, unbiased observer 
and even heroic interventionist during the Japanese invasion of China.53 This role was 
exemplified through the heavy reliance on Western sources in the Tokyo Tribunals and is 
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still maintained through the championing of figures like John Rabe, “the Good Nazi,” and 
Minnie Vautrin, “the Goddess at Nanking,” in film and literature. The previous section on 
Chinese wartime reporting demonstrates the significant impact that Western journalism 
had Chinese coverage of Japanese aggressions. However, by examining the development 
of Western, and particularly American, coverage of Japan’s actions throughout the war, it 
becomes clear that, even for the “unbiased” U.S., which had minimal initial relation to 
the Sino-Japanese war, journalistic productions were subject to the changing goals of a 
nationalistic agenda. Ultimately, therefore, the modern perceptions of the U.S. and 
Western world generally as the unbiased observer in the Second Sino-Japanese war are 
contested in the larger context of geopolitical developments during the war.  
 The most well-known Western reporters in China during the wartime era were the 
members of the Nanking Safety Zone. In addition to providing humanitarian aid to those 
Chinese unable to flee the city in the weeks preceding the Japanese attack, these figures 
worked, much like Chinese officials, to garner Western support and aid. Yoshida 
examines the works of these NSZ figures, arguing that 
The Relief Committee’s primary goal was to appeal to the world about the crisis [in 
Nanking] in order to get financial aid. For this reason, its members wrote or backed 
the publication of several books and pamphlets for dissemination abroad. These 
included Lewis Smythe’s War Damage in the Nanking Area December, 1937 to 
March 1938; Miner S. Bates’s Crop Investigation in the Nanking Area and Sundry 
Economic Data, and his The Nanking Population: Employment, Earnings, and 
Expenditures.54  
 These works represent the efforts of NSZ leaders and serve as important resources 
in modern Nanking Atrocity scholarship. In addition to these texts, the collected letters of 
                                                             
54 Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity,” 254. 
39 
 
these figures to recipients abroad help establish wartime perceptions of the Nanking 
Atrocity.55 Some of these letters were even published in the works of Western writers 
who were not positioned at the Safety Zone, like Harold Timperley. George Fitch, born in 
China and a director of the Nanking Safety Zone, wrote such entries, which were later 
used in Timperley’s What War Means: 
Fitch’s friends included Wellington Koo and Harold J. Timperley, an Australian 
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Shanghai. Timperley received the 
letter [from Fitch] and included it in his expose, What War Means, though he 
concealed Fitch’s identity. This book was published in countries such as Britain, the 
United States, China, France, and even Japan—although imperial government 
censorship prevented ordinary Japanese from reading it.56  
 As demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, there existed a significant 
interchange of ideas between Chinese and Western sources. Furthermore, the information 
provided by these sources sometimes served as the first reports documenting important 
events. According to David Askew’s “Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and 
Civilian Victims,” Timperley, “a secret member of the Kuomintang [KMT] government’s 
International Propaganda Department, edited the first detailed account of the atrocities at 
Nanking.”57 As the first written account of the Nanking Atrocity, Timperley’s text carries 
significant value; his work provides not only proof of the account, but it also serves as a 
reference point for countless other Nanking texts. Consequently, Atrocity narratives that 
rely on the interpretations presented in Timperley’s text are rooted in Western, rather than 
Chinese, perceptions of the event.       
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 Furthermore, despite the best intentions of these humanitarian figures, their 
reports pose additional obstacles for modern scholarship given factual inaccuracies. Even 
when discussing the remaining population after the majority of the civilians fled 
Nanking, Western reporters present varying figures. John Rabe, who described the 
remaining residents as “‘the poorest of the poor’ who lacked the means to flee,’” reported 
that “800,000 of the original population had left,”58 while other Westerners reported the 
figure as far less than 200,000: 
Lily Abegg, who herself left Nanking on 29 November, wrote in a 19 December 
Frankfurter Zeitung article that it was 150,000. The New York Times on 16 
December said that the NSZ ‘shelters 150,000.’ Arthur Menken wrote on 17 
December in the Chicago Tribune that ‘[m]ore than 100,000 Chinese sought refuge 
in the zone,’ and on 18 December, F. Tillman Durdin wrote of ‘upward of 100,000 
noncombatants’ in the NSZ with ‘residents, numbering upward of 50,000 who 
sought no sanctuary in the zone.’ These journalists believed that the entire 
population of Nanking city was about 150,000—with 100,000 inside and 50,000 
outside the NSZ.59 
While the writings of these Westerns could theoretically aid Nanking research, the 
data that they present is ultimately unreliable as due to factual inaccuracy. As Askew 
explains, these figures likely stem from a Los Angeles Times article that discussed IC 
plans to provide sanctuary for 100,000 Nanking refugees but do not ultimately reflect the 
accurate numbers of Nanking residents. The amount of inaccurate information stemming 
from Western observers in China presents a significant obstacle to Nanking scholarship, 
especially when it is remembered that many Chinese sources derived information from 
Western outlets.          
 While factual inaccuracies are detrimental to this scholarship, the realization that 
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Western wartime reporting was, as in China, influenced by changing political motivations 
is perhaps an even more troubling issue. While most early coverage of the Japanese 
invasion and the Atrocity provided crucial investigative reporting without overt 
nationalistic overtones, later journalistic representations prioritized asserting the myth of 
a Japanese “national character” through depictions of barbarism and inborn inhumanity. 
This clear change in the goals of Western reporting followed Japan’s attacks on Pearl 
Harbor, demonstrating the impact of geopolitics on international Nanking narratives: 
The outrage in Nanking did not achieve symbolic status in either Japan or China 
during the war. In japan, most people wholeheartedly supported the war effort and 
celebrated the capture of Nanking; and in China, Nanking was but one of many 
Japanese atrocities. By contrast, however, in the United States, and especially after 
Pearl Harbor, the Nanking Atrocity became a symbol of Japanese barbarism and 
ethnically encoded cruelty. Influential daily newspapers such as the New York Times 
and Chicago Daily News reported imperial army brutality in Nanking during and 
immediately after the event took place.60 
 Once the U.S. became involved in the world conflict, Western reportage 
increasingly emphasized, likely to a greater degree than even Chinese reports, the racial 
inferiority and inhumanity of the Japanese forces. Even Timperley, who had previously 
maintained a more objective, distanced tone in his early works on the Second Sino-
Japanese war began to reflect this growing, international, anti-Japanese sentiment: 
In 1942, Timperley published Japan: A World Problem in the United States. 
Contrary to his earlier 1938 volume [What War Means], which carefully avoided 
demonizing the entire Japanese people, this book explained Japanese aggression and 
atrocities through an alleged ‘national character.’ He stressed that deep-rooted 
psychological forces had driven the Japanese people as a whole to lust after world 
conquest….61 
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 The evolution of Timperley’s writing on the Japanese invasion, therefore, 
exemplifies the larger developments in Western perceptions of the Nanking 
Atrocity and Japanese aggression generally. In the weeks and months following 
Pearl Harbor, a dramatic shift occurred in journalism, wherein writers began to 
construct the notion of a Japanese “character,” which could be wielded to explain 
the atrocities committed not only in China, but, of even more significance to these 
Western reporters, the Japanese atrocities committed in the U.S.    
 The importance of this shift in journalistic representation of Japanese 
aggressors cannot be understated, as it reflects crucial developments not only in the 
field of journalistic standards but in the U.S. treatment of American-Japanese. 
While journalism always, to some extent, relies on preexisting interpretive 
templates to frame national tragedies, the post-Pearl Harbor depictions of Japanese 
actions demonstrate a more startling type of nationalism in Western reporting—a 
nationalism that the “unbiased observer” Nanking narratives fail to address. Once 
the early conceptions of a “national character” were introduced into the national 
dialogue via wartime journalism, written depictions of the Japanese became 
progressively more racist and more associated with representations of Nazis, as 
exemplified by the works of James Young:  
James Young, an American journalist who also had lived in Japan, published Our 
Enemy, a twenty-five-cent paperback in 1942—long after Hitler’s depredations 
against the Jews in Europe had become public knowledge. Young denounced 
Japan’s ‘national character’ as being inherently aggressive and barbarous. His 
book’s cover shows an ominously slant-eyed, buck-toothed Japanese soldier wearing 
glasses and a Nazi-like uniform. In his right hand, a knife drips blood; in the other is 
a torn U.S. flag…..His mistrust and hatred probably derived from a two-month 
period of imprisonment in Japan in 1940. To him, even U.S.-born Japanese-
43 
 
Americans were agents of imperial Japan preparing to aid Japanese troops when 
they landed on American shores.62 
 The “national character” argument in wartime reporting provided writers like 
James Young the platform to present personal experiences with Japanese captors as 
representative of a grander, irrefutable, monolithic image of Japan. The consequences of 
this framing are clear in the U.S. treatment of American-Japanese citizens. Following 
Pearl Harbor, the anti-Japanese racism exemplified in Young’s writing led to the 
justification of internment camps and other restrictions imposed against Japanese-
American citizens. In the subsequent years and even modern-day debates, America’s 
unethical treatment of Japanese-Americans has remained a significant social issue in 
WWII memory.        
 Despite the proliferation of anti-Japanese-based reporting in the post-Pearl Harbor 
years, there were some groups who actively challenged these monolithic depictions. 
Yoshida examines the efforts of one such group, Amerasia, in attempting to deconstruct 
these stereotypical, racially-charged depictions of Japan’s barbaric “national character”: 
In 1943, the editors of Amerasia, a left-liberal journal, expressed concern about the 
numerous books that popularized this monolithic negative image of the 
Japanese….They urged readers to reject stereotypes that pronounced all Japanese as 
united by dreams of world conquest and pointed out that the imperial government 
had to employ police to silence democrats, socialists, and communists who opposed 
the war effort.63   
 The articles published under Amerasia helped reveal the falsehoods inherent in 
the increasingly popular visions of Japan. Amersia championed the works of one author, 
Taro Yashima, whose personal experiences with Japanese political imprisonment rivalled 
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those of Young. In The New Sun, Yashima presents these experiences, revealing the 
diversity of Japanese political thought as evidenced by his fellow prisoners, “ethnic 
minorities as well as Japanese socialists and communists, all of whom the police 
imprisoned as being harmful to the empire.”64 Thus, Yashima and other similar writers 
attempted to challenge the monolithic image of a brainwashed Japanese nationalism. 
 However, despite these efforts to right negative perceptions of the Japanese, the 
works of authors like Timperley and Young, as well as the publications of daily journals 
and news outlets, reveal the prevalence of this stereotypical reporting. Furthermore, 
Yoshida argues, despite journals like Amerasia, which presented alternatives to the 
“national character” arguments of Timperley, the arguments presented in such outlets did 
not represent majority views and ultimately had limited social impact: 
Amerasia was highly exceptional in being a high-brow, leftist publication. In 
general, the American media paid scant attention to Japanese life after Pearl Harbor. 
Instead, a monolithic image of the Japanese as bestial barbarians, who committed 
butchery in Nanking, became increasingly popular in the United States. That image 
justified not only America’s war effort against imperial Japan and Japanese 
militarism, but also the mass murder of Japanese civilians by the fire bombing of 
major cities across the archipelago, ending with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. During the Pacific War (1941-45), the Nanking Atrocity was one 
objective piece of ‘evidence’ that racially biased American authors used to ‘prove’ 
their point.65 
 For Western audiences, the arguments presented in journals like Amerasia 
uncomfortably challenged widely-held beliefs about Japanese barbarism. Thus, while 
there are some post-Pearl Harbor publications that refused to frame the war in the larger 
“national character” argument of Timperley and others, these sources were not, 
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ultimately, reflective of the leading war interpretations. Instead, these post-Pearl Harbor 
beliefs demonstrate the subjectivity and vulnerability of even Western wartime 
perceptions, a nation that was previously ambivalent about WWII involvement. 
 Despite the modern-day memories of Western interventionism and objectivity, the 
reality of Western wartime reporting reflects nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment that 
became increasingly accepted in post-Pearl Harbor media. While Western journalism was 
essential to the development of early records of the Nanking Atrocity, the majority of 
wartime coverage served to reinforce negative stereotypes and present a monolithic 
depiction of the Japanese—the pervasiveness of which allowed for the justification of 
Japanese internment camps. Although the U.S. has, through some reparative measures, 
attempted to repent for its own wartime atrocities, the narrative of Western impartiality 
must be reexamined in order to further Nanking scholarship. By continuing to perpetuate 
such a narrative of Western objectivity and intervention, scholars and journalists give 
countries such as the United States seeming justification for self-motivated international 
involvement. Despite the selfless actions of foreign NSZ representatives, these figures 
and their experiences cannot be considered representations of general Western 
perceptions during the war, as analysis of Western wartime reporting demonstrates the 
subjectivity and nationalism inherent in Western perceptions of Japanese aggressions.  
Japanese Wartime Reporting 
Similar to Chinese and Western wartime reports, Japanese journalistic coverage of 
the country’s gradual expansion into China was documented and presented within the 
larger context of nationalistic pursuits. Consequently, when events such as the Atrocity 
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were reported, a hyperbolically nationalistic tone was employed to elevate Japanese 
morale. This framing of wartime journalism in Japan has created significant modern 
debate over the legitimacy of issues discussed. As Fogel notes, the value of this 
nationalistic reporting outweighed potential consequences in the eyes of both soldiers and 
journalists: “Japanese soldiers who might have been able to report the scale of the killings 
obviously had no motivation to do so. Japanese journalists on the scene were subject to 
government censorship, or for the most part they suppressed the story voluntarily.”66 Just 
as Chinese and Western wartime reporting reflect political goals and social concerns of 
the era, Japanese journalism must also be examined from the perspective of national 
goals. Given these influences, it is crucial to recognize the unreliability of Japanese 
reportage that stems from the nationalistic tone of the writing: 
In considering how ordinary postwar Japanese grasped this issue of culpability, we 
must examine the role played by the media in the wartime-to-postwar transition. 
German journalists and newspapers who praised Hitler and the Nazi war effort 
stopped publishing in the postwar era; Japanese journalists and newspapers that had 
played similar roles did not. They neither admitted nor atoned for whipping up 
hatred against China or for spreading lies about the war issued by Imperial 
Headquarters. Those wartime lies, for example, held that using the atomic bomb 
showed how desperate the United States had become, or that wearing thick clothing 
would protect people from radiation in further nuclear attacks.67 
Since a major component of modern Atrocity debates is the wartime awareness and 
culpability of the general Japanese public, Wakabayashi’s argument about the role of 
journalists in spreading misinformation or censoring truths is important to consider. Even 
if the general public were exposed to journalistic coverage of the Nanking Atrocity, there 
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is little evidence that this reporting would have been accurate or equivalent to the 
standards of contemporary Nanking scholars in China. Rather, the reality of Japanese 
wartime reporting reflects the emphasis of nationalistic overtones instead of journalistic 
objectivity.          
 However, as with Chinese and Western coverage, Japanese wartime reporting did 
evolve over the course of the war. While later Japanese publications demonstrate a clear 
vilification of the Chinese, some early Japanese reports of victory in China were more 
moderate in their depictions of victims, despite the clearly nationalistic tone of the 
writings. While Japanese victories against the Chinese were celebrated in major social 
displays, early articles discussing these advances did not depict Chinese victims in the 
dehumanizing terms that characterize later reports. In “Massacres Near Mufushan,” Ono 
Kenji examines the Fukushima response to the fall of Nanking. Although the city held 
public festivals to celebrate the Japanese victory, the implications of this advance were 
not analyzed in full detail: 
Nanking fell on 13 December, but Fukushima residents had been eagerly 
anticipating that historic event for several days. Partly in response to ‘guidance’ 
from military authorities, they held lantern parades and other celebratory events all 
over the prefecture—including Aizu-Wakamatsu barracks—to mark the capture of 
the enemy capital. Just at that point, on the fifteenth, came news that the local Sixty-
fifth Regiment had taken this huge number of the enemy as prisoners of war 
(POWs). As might be imagined, the Fukushima press played up this joyful event to 
the fullest. For the next two days, however, there was no news about what became of 
those prisoners.68  
 These early Japanese reports of the fall of Nanking demonstrate a particular 
subset of nationalistic reporting—a type that celebrates the defeat of Chinese opponents 
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and commends Japanese heroism without depicting the full violence of the scene or using 
supremacist language to condemn Chinese inferiority.     
 However, there were also early Japanese reports of the Nanking Atrocity which 
did actively highlight and champion the brutality of the Japanese forces. This form of 
reporting is most apparent in discussions of the 100-man killing contest. Reports of the 
contest were situated within the growing anticipation of the invasion of Nanking; as 
Yoshida describes, journalistic depictions of the contest, such as the original Tokyo nichi 
nichi shinbun article, the first to mention the contest, served to “[whip] up nationalism to 
a fever pitch.”69 In the weeks and months leading up to the invasion of Nanking, Japanese 
journalists sought to heighten nationalist sentiments through depictions militaristic 
prowess. For the most part, the mass public, under the guidance of news publications, 
celebrated these demonstrations of Japanese dominance and continued to support the war 
effort.           
 However, these depictions of Japanese militarism present a crucial issue in 
considering the impacts of wartime reporting on the general Japanese public. Public 
support of militaristic brutality cannot simply be attributed to the nationalistic overtones 
of wartime coverage; existing confidence in the righteousness of Japan’s actions were 
reinforced by another key element in the depictions of battlefront action: Chinese 
aggression against Japanese troops. Yoshida provides examples of this type of wartime 
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reporting, demonstrating the ways in which Japanese articles emphasized Chinese 
aggression in order to justify Japan’s “defensive” tactics: 
Japanese newspapers and other government-authorized media played up Chinese 
brutalities, particularly after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 7 July 1937 and its 
aftermath, when imperial armed forces expanded hostilities to central China. On 4 
August 1937, for example, the Tokyo Asahi shinbun detailed killing and looting by 
Chinese troops in Tungchou, near Peiping….It condemned Chinese ‘savagery’ and 
expressed outrage at the murder of some 200 Japanese and Korean residents, 
including women, children, and infants. Other major daily newspapers at home 
highlighted Chinese barbarism at Tungchou as part of concerted campaigns to stir up 
anti-Chinese sentiments among ordinary Japanese.70  
 Japanese militaristic policies that could be considered inhumane, then, were 
justified through these depictions of Chinese “barbarism” and “savagery”—interestingly, 
the same terms used in Chinese wartime discussions of Japanese destruction. Chinese 
resistance was used to demonstrate the need for Japanese persistence and to assert 
Japan’s moral hierarchy in the war.        
 Furthermore, images of Chinese inferiority were reinforced through depictions of 
the Japanese Imperial army’s comparative civility. While the Japanese were patient, 
respectful, and generous, journalists claimed, the Chinese were uncivilly unresponsive to 
these displays:   
When Japanese troops surrounded the walled city, the press played up Japan’s 
generosity and righteousness. To save the lives of Chinese soldiers as well as 
historical sites in Nanking, commander Matsui Iwane of the Central China Area 
Army (CCAA) urged his Chinese counterpart, T’ang Sheng-chih, to surrender, and 
waited a full day before launching his all-out attack. But, as the Tokyo Asahi shinbun 
put it, T’ang ‘rudely ignored Matsui’s generous attitude of bushido [the samurai 
ethos]’ and forced the imperial army to attack the city, thereby causing needless 
death and destruction.71 
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 These reports demonstrate the ways in which journalists encouraged the general 
public to reconcile Japanese destruction in China by presenting the Chinese as 
perpetrators and unwilling to cooperate in the pursuit of peace. From an analysis of these 
sources, then, it is clear that the Japanese public was familiarized with a significantly 
different narrative of militaristic exploits than the memories that they would be 
confronted with in more recent Nanking debates. These narratives either deemphasized 
Chinese victimization or justified atrocities committed against the Chinese through the 
argument that the Japanese troops were left with no other alternative. Reports or literary 
representations during the war era that did not perpetuate this interpretation of Japanese 
militarism were effectively barred from dissemination in society. Thus, argues Yoshida,  
Army and government censors banned all account that even hinted at the possibility 
that Japanese troops were conducting atrocities, including works of fiction such as 
Ishikawa Tatsuzo’s Ikite iru heitai (Living Soldiers). Thus, unlike in the United 
States, where articles seemingly sympathetic to the Japanese enemy might appear in 
journals such as Amerasia, only government-approved accounts could legally be 
published or circulated in wartime Japanese society.72  
 Ultimately, Japanese government censorship prevented writers from challenging 
the majority belief that Japanese aggressions in China were justified and worthy of 
national celebration. The reasonings for this careful concealment of more detailed 
descriptions of Chinese sufferings mirrors the U.S. justification for the proliferation of 
anti-Japanese texts—the concern that alternative narratives, which made the opponent 
more sympathetic, could seriously hamper war efforts. Yoshida argues that this 
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consideration led the Japanese media to downplay or eliminate potentially negative 
reports of Japanese actions: 
In wartime Japan, government-authorized accounts of fighting at Nanking and in 
China as a whole never discussed mass murder, rape, and looting by imperial armed 
forces for fear that the truth would damage their image and call into question Japan’s 
purative war aims of liberating Asians and creating a peaceful coprosperity sphere in 
the region.73  
 The general, accepted form of wartime reporting in Japan thus enabled 
unquestioning support of the military’s advances by presenting a narrative of Japanese 
heroism and chivalry in the face of Chinese barbarism. These reports effectively 
encouraged mass nationalistic sentiments and have led to significant obstacles in modern 
remembrance and reconciliation of the Atrocity in the Japanese consciousness. For those 
that were only ever introduced to the heroism of the Japanese army, Chinese depictions 
of rape and murder appear as a direct affront to history and national pride.    
 While these reports reflect the most widely-maintained narrative of Japanese 
actions, there were alternative depictions and arguments propagated in the war era by 
dissenting writers. Yoshida provides example of these publications, such as “Fassho kyoi 
no Nihon” (Japan under the Threat of Fascism), printed in Seattle-based Kyokuto senso 
nyusu (Far-Eastern News), and Japanese translations of Timperley’s What War Means, 
translated by Japanese national Kaji Wataru and disseminated in Japan to the extent that 
forces actively sought to diminish their presence.74 These materials demonstrate early 
attempts to challenge the prevailing visions of Japanese militarism in China. Often, these 
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efforts stemmed from a sense of resentment toward those ideological oppressors and 
censors. Wakabayashi references the work of a Japanese author, Seno Kappa, whose 
writing reflects this resentment: “As Seno Kappa’s bestselling semifictional 
autobiography Shonen H, relates: ‘More than the enemy who fire-bombed us, I hated 
those [Japanese] who kept deceiving us by lying or hiding the truth—the government, 
military, and newspapers.’”75 For these writers, the censored, nationalistic, propagandistic 
message of most journalistic publications represented a greater danger than wartime 
enemies. Other writers like Suzuki Akira and Yamamota Shichihei similarly voiced 
discontent with Japanese journalistic standards, as the media “avidly promoted 
imperialist aggression in the name of patriotism up to 1945, but these same journalists, 
often writing in the same papers, now fostered goodwill toward China by atoning for 
wartime sins.”76          
 In addition to charging the Japanese media with inconsistent and even 
hypocritical reporting on the Second Sino-Japanese war, these writers condemned 
reporters for a committing a more specific offense in the pursuit of nationalism: 
overemphasizing or fabricating the 100-man killing contest. For Suzuki, it was “absurd it 
was for anyone to take [the Tokyo nichi nichi article] seriously at all—whether in 1937 or in 
1972.”77 Suzuki’s main contention of the article concerned the sensationalist, 
entertainment-style of reporting that was employed. Reports of the 100-man killing 
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contest, Suzuki argued, echoed the style and dramatization of silent films or medieval 
war tales and served to excite rather than inform: 
Suzuki reasoned that Asami wrote a propaganda-cum-entertainment piece in an era 
when journalists did that as part of the war effort….As outside Western observers, 
we might liken these superhuman heroics to those depicted in the Japanese ‘three 
human bombs’ saga fabricated during the 1932 Shanghai Incident, to wartime John 
Wayne movies, to impossible exploits portrayed in the 1960s television series 
Combat or, more recently, to Rambo films.78  
Suzuki’s critique of the hyperbolic descriptions of Japanese victories, exemplified 
in the 100-man killing contest reports, provides insight into the realities of Japanese 
wartime interpretations and the consequences of this nationalistic standard of journalism. 
As Wakabayashi notes, Suzuki felt that the trials and executions of the supposed leaders 
of the contest, Noda and Mukai, were based solely on the information provided in these 
ungrounded Japanese reports.79         
 Incidentally, these debates over the 100-man killing contest led to one of Japan’s 
most significant investigative reporting projects. Amid the growing international tensions 
in the postwar years, journalist Honda Katsuichi, a reporter for the Asahi shinbun, 
travelled through China in order to test existing Japanese perceptions of the war; 
however, Katsuichi’s findings supported an image not of Japanese heroism but of 
Chinese suffering: 
He toured the PRC for forty days in 1971 to interview victims of Japanese 
aggression, and published gut-wrenching reports accompanied by photographs in 
this newspaper from August to December. This was a tour de force in investigative 
reporting. It exposed in graphic detail fellow Japanese who perpetrated hideous 
atrocities. More than anyone else, Honda forced Japan to confront Nanking as an 
ethical issue for the first time since the IMTFE. In 1972 he republished these reports 
in Chugoku no Nihongun (The Japanese Army in China) and in Chugoku no tabi 
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(Travels in China). The latter became a best-seller and appeared in paperback. A 
Chinese translation came out in 1972, but Honda had a negligible impact elsewhere 
because his writings on Nanking were not translated into English until 1999.80  
 Despite the limitations that prevented Katsuichi’s work from becoming more 
widely-disseminated, his research serves as an important landmark in journalistic 
representations of Japanese aggressions in China. While the reports are not necessarily 
from the wartime era, Katsuichi’s images of China present an alternative to the standard 
narrative of Atrocity involvement in the years preceding the peak of the Nanking debates. 
In contrast to earlier reports that deemphasized Chinese victimhood in favor of Japanese 
nationalism, Katsuichi’s text presents the reality of Japanese brutality in China and 
delineates a shift in Japanese discussions of the Atrocity.     
 Japanese wartime reporting, like its Chinese and Western counterparts, reveals the 
ways in which nationalistic goals influenced the depictions of the Second Sino-Japanese 
war. Despite the separate narratives linked to each country in modern perceptions of the 
Nanking issue, China, the U.S., and Japan shared more commonalities in journalistic 
framing techniques than differences. Like the later cinematic, literary, and educational 
memorializations of the Nanking Atrocity, these materials established and reinforced an 
interpretive template for each society; however, wartime reports of the Atrocity are 
unique from these other sources by virtue of their immediate responsiveness to the 
events. Unlike the myriad of cinematic and literary texts that were created in the 1980s 
Nanking revival, many of which were created by writers and directors with no personal 
experiences of Nanking, these reports reflect the perceptions of individuals who lived 
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through the period. Although these texts are no more objective than the novels and films 
of modern Nanking commemoration, these early reports provide insight as to each 
country’s interpretations and national goals during the war. Unfortunately, wartime 
reporting has yet to receive substantial investigation in Atrocity scholarship. The ideas 
presented in wartime reporting can provide insight as to the ways that Nanking memory, 
and memory of national tragedies generally, is influenced by political goals. In order to 
examine the ways in which Nanking memories and narratives have evolved during the 
postwar years into their current form, it is crucial to analyze the ways that war-era reports 
have impacted this process of understanding and remembering.  
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Chapter	IV:	Educational	Discourse	Regarding	the	Atrocity		 Education serves as a platform for the collectivization and dissemination of 
chosen, standardized interpretations of history. The role of education in preserving 
official memory has led the textbook debates between China and Japan to become an 
infamous topic in Atrocity scholarship. Public memory formation is certainly impacted 
by these official narratives; however, scholars cannot discredit the role of individual or 
group dynamics in the acceptance, rejection, or modification of these formal accounts of 
events. Like many issues related to the Nanking Atrocity, education is a topic that is both 
fundamental to future scholarship and decisively used as a symbolic argument by China 
and Japan. Given the role of educational materials in reflecting a national interpretation 
of historical events, the nature of China and Japan’s educational standards regarding the 
topic are worthy of examination.81   
Chinese Educational Discourse 
Controversy over each nation’s public education concerning the Nanking Atrocity 
did not arise until nearly half a century after the Tokyo Tribunals. While the tribunals 
allowed for what can be considered informal memory formation (since a conclusive 
interpretation of the events was never officially established), the ambiguity of the 
proceedings and rulings prevented the concretization of a single international 
understanding of each country’s role in the Second Sino-Japanese war. This topic is 
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important for several reasons. Foremost, educational standards concerning the Atrocity in 
China and Japan are worthy of examination due to the significant role that this topic 
maintains in international disputes. As with issues such as proper naming and death toll 
figures for the Atrocity, appropriate educational discourse is often wielded as a 
placeholder argument—rather than discuss the nature of the event, China and Japan often 
perform this argument of ethics and culpability through more minor, secondary topics 
related to depictions of the event. As a result of the Tokyo Tribunals’ ambivalent rulings 
and the careful economic relationship between China and Japan in the postwar years, 
Atrocity acceptance and understanding are built on precarious geopolitical foundations. 
Consequently, each nation’s evolution of Nanking education has shifted with the course 
of geopolitics.          
 For several decades following the Atrocity and Tokyo Tribunals, discourse 
regarding these events, particularly in the realm of education, was limited. Scholars have 
analyzed the reasons for this delay, often criticizing China for manipulating the issue for 
political gain or condemning Japan for attempting to revise its own wartime involvement. 
In both cases, commentators often accomplish little more than presenting the most 
general assessments of the issue, prompting the need for a closer examination of Atrocity 
treatment in education through learning tools like museums and textbooks.   
 In “Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and 
Japan,” Daniel Sneider examines the development of Nanking education in China. In 
order to contextualize his analysis of history textbooks in Japan and China, Sneider 
presents the various political and historical factors in China that impacted education on 
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the Atrocity. He asserts that, in the post-war decades marked by the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76), Chinese society gleaned only an unofficial knowledge of the Atrocity through 
film: “….the wartime era was mainly portrayed through propagandistic films. The so-
called ‘Red Classics,’ such as Tunnel Warfare and Landmine Warfare, depicted 
Communist guerillas of the Eighth Route Army in the north and New Fourth Army in the 
south successfully attacking the Japanese army.”82 Early Chinese accounts of the Atrocity 
present a more uplifting, victorious interpretation of the events as Chinese soldiers battled 
fiercely against their Japanese opponents. Violi examines this memory dichotomy as 
“victor” and “victim” narratives:  
….in China, it was only after Deng Xiaoping unleashed his economic reforms in the 
early 1980s that Chinese nationalists rediscovered Nanjing, together with new forms 
of remembering the past and new forms of social identification. A shift occurred at 
that point from a “victor narrative” to a “victim narrative” to use Peter Giest’s 
words. Significantly, this shift from a rhetoric of revolutionary heroism to a self-
representation based on victimization and the exhibition of Japanese atrocities is 
associated with the new globalizing market economy and the increasing gap between 
rich and poor in Chinese society.83   
The former narrative of victory and heroism was apparent in China’s wartime 
reporting and post-war films, literature, and memorials—the foundational materials of 
China’s “informal” Nanking Atrocity memory. The victor’s narrative is dominant in 
China’s first Rape of Nanking memorial, which presents China’s invaluable heroism in 
the face of World War II’s fascist oppressors: “China is depicted as the ‘first country to 
fight the fascist aggressor,’ its contribution decisive in the outcome of the global conflict, 
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pinning down millions of Japanese troops, allowing the West and the Soviet Union to 
concentrate their forces on Nazi Germany, and defeating Japanese forces in the 
battlefield.”84 The victor’s narrative as exemplified through this monument is distinctive 
from China’s later memories of the war, which are characterized by a sense of 
victimization. Furthermore, the conscious efforts of this museum to create a Chinese war 
memory, rather than an international narrative, are demonstrated through the site’s use of 
Chinese-only text: “The captions on the museum exhibits are only in Chinese—the 
audience for this history lesson is almost entirely internal, though museum officials say 
some 200,000 foreigners have visited since it opened in 1987, most of them Japanese.”85 
Therefore, the victorious, Chinese-centric nature of early post-war memory can be 
examined through China’s first Nanking museum.       
 The shift in Chinese war memory from “victor narrative” to “victim narrative” 
can thereby be analyzed through a comparison of postwar monuments. As Sneider notes, 
a secondary Nanjing museum was constructed contemporaneously with the 
aforementioned site. However, despite being completed in the eighties, reconstructions to 
the museum in the 2000s reflect an adaptation to shifting war memory: “The new 
museum conveys a narrative of Chinese victimization at the hands of a depraved 
Japanese army, connecting this to China’s history of humiliation at the hands of Western 
and Japanese imperialists.”86 In addition to this altered narrative, the museum also 
features another significant separation from its Beijing counterpart in the form of 
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translated text: “In contrast to the Beijing museum, the Nanjing Memorial is clearly 
aimed at a global as well as a Chinese audience. Captions are translated into Japanese and 
English and a gift shop offers an array of materials in foreign languages. It attracts more 
visitors than any other museum in China....”87 Almost as compelling as this transition in 
purpose and narrative are the methods by which the museum constructs this memory of 
Nanking. In an effort to mirror the pathological impact of other World War II 
commemorative sites, including the Washington, D.C. Holocaust Memorial, Yad Veshem 
in Jerusalem, Auschwitz, and Japanese memorials for atomic bombing victims, 
renovation director Zhu Cheng Shan reconstructed the site to convey the narrative of “not 
only of Chinese victims but also the foreigners who played a key role in trying to protect 
them and in telling the story of the massacre to the world….The message of the Nanjing 
Memorial is unrelentingly clear—this is China’s own Holocaust.”88  
 The decision to base renovations on Washington, D.C.’s Holocaust Memorial is 
reflective of the persuasive power of the site and the ethos of the narrative that it presents. 
The D.C. museum is renowned for its enforcement of a firsthand experience of the 
Holocaust through design layout and visual and audio cues. In “Reflections on Criticism 
and Bodies: Parables from Public Places,” Carole Blair reflects on the rhetorical nature of 
important U.S. landmarks and remarks on the importance of understanding the 
materiality of rhetoric. In this article, Blair examines the rhetorical construction of the 
Washington, D.C. Holocaust Memorial and the influences that led to its formation:  
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At about the same time that the Holocaust Memorial Museum was built and 
dedicated, there was a strong movement of Holocaust denial in Europe and the 
United States. That the Museum was responding to that seems clear. At every turn, 
the visitor is situated as a ‘witness.’ And there are clear bids to establish the 
historical reality of the atrocities and horror with photographs, survivor narratives, 
graphic films, collections of personal possessions of victims, and reproductions of 
death camp accoutrements, like an oven and ‘medical experimentation’ labs.89 
    
The parallels between the Nanking Memorial and the Washington, D.C. 
Holocaust Memorial are therefore even greater than material elements—the responsive 
nature of each monument to larger political debates demonstrates the significant role of 
such learning tools in the flux of historical consciousness. Just as the D.C. museum 
served to establish a dominant, “official” World War II narrative, the Nanking Memorial 
similarly countered revisionist tendencies in the postwar decades, as “Zhu claims that the 
idea for the construction of his museum was prompted by the dispute that erupted with 
Japan in 1982 over the revision of Japanese history textbooks to remove language 
describing the war as an ‘invasion’ and an act of aggression.”90 Thus, the physical 
renovations in Nanking memorials reflect the changing nature of public war memory in 
China. The role of educational tools like monuments and textbooks in establishing and 
adapting collective memory is significant, and therefore must be examined in the larger 
context of historical consciousness.        
 Initial perceptions of the war were steeped in the political aspirations of the Cold 
War, resulting in a specific historical narrative of the Atrocity. During the Cold War,  
“when the PRC still counted itself as part of the communist world, albeit in competition 
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with the Soviet Union for leadership of that world, the Chinese Communists were also 
not eager to acknowledge a war of resistance in which China and the US were allied.”91 
Chinese wartime memory formation was complicated by the political milieu of the Cold 
War and the Communist era; as Sneider argues, these factors led to the complex, now-
abandoned notions of a “victor’s narrative” in China: 
Remembrance of the Nanjing Massacre posed particular challenges for Communist 
historical narratives about the war. The battle in Nanjing was entirely a KMT affair, 
without any Communist involvement—and it was hardly a heroic affair. The KMT 
government made initial efforts after the war to gather evidence of Japanese crimes 
to submit to the war crimes tribunals in Tokyo and those held in China, as well as to 
memorialize the event. But the civil war, and the Cold War that followed, cut off 
any further contacts with the wartime allies or even with Japanese seeking to 
illuminate the crimes of Imperial Japan.92       
     
Thus, the “victor narrative” that dominated post-war Chinese memory can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the political aspirations of the Communist party during the 
Cold War. However, to assume that this version of public memory was constructed 
entirely in response to political motivations would be a misrepresentation of the historical 
and social developments of the last several decades; for, as Sneider notes, the massive 
information revolution of the eighties and nineties is a contributing factor: “Chinese 
commentators also attribute this shift to the impact of the process of reform and opening 
after 1979, which brought with it a greater flow of information, including access to the 
translations of Western historians.”93 Therefore, the shifting tides of geopolitics, along 
with other contributing social factors, led to a revision of Chinese war memory.   
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 The differences between the narratives that the two Nanking memorials present 
parallels the development of war memory through another key educational tool—
textbooks. The textbook debate in international Nanking Atrocity discourse is, in reality, 
reflective of substantial social concerns regarding appropriate educational goals in the 
wake of wartime conflict, despite the cursory treatment with which this topic is often 
dealt. Generalized claims have often reduced the role of this issue to that of a symbolic 
argument. While Japan’s textbook dilemmas often serve as the foci of these debates, an 
examination of their Chinese counterparts provides significant insight as to the 
development of Nanking Atrocity education. As Sneider asserts, the initial construction 
of monuments dedicated to the Nanking Atrocity was a harbinger of greater education 
policy changes regarding the event. These changes were responsive to the growing social 
turmoil in Communist China and sought to reestablish a unifying historical narrative 
through the “Patriotic Education Campaign: “Begun in 1991, the campaign was designed 
to provide young Chinese with a version of history that de-emphasized the Maoist era 
narrative of class struggle within China in favor of the depiction of China as a victim of 
humiliation and brutality at the hands of foreign powers, going back to the days of the 
Opium war.”94          
 Given the separate historical-social contextualizations of the pre- and post-
campaign textbooks, Chinese society underwent substantial memory reconstruction 
throughout the postwar decades. While the former textbooks sought to unify Chinese 
society through a narrative of wartime achievement and collective heroism, later Atrocity 
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education faced the need to pacify an increasingly fragmented and disillusioned society. 
The post-campaign narrative is one that, according to Sneider, “suits the nationalist 
mobilization of a populace no longer motivated by neo-Communist ideology.”95 This 
narrative is perpetuated through the nation’s history textbook:  
The standard textbook on Chinese contemporary and modern history, published by 
the state’s People’s Education Publishing House, was in circulation from the 1980s 
through the middle of the first decade of this century. Beginning in 2004, it was 
gradually replaced throughout the country by a new, completely revised textbook, 
Chinese History, which offered a significantly altered version of the wartime period, 
one more in tune with the Patriotic Education Campaign begun in the 90s.96   
While the former, pre-eighties history textbook in China presented little 
discussion of the Nanking Atrocity, occupying “only two paragraphs with only one photo 
of bodies being buried by Japanese soldiers,”97 the revised textbook gives greater analysis 
of the events and the motivations behind Japan’s brutality. This resource situates 
Japanese aggression within the larger scheme of Sino-Japanese relations, thereby 
indicating a causal relationship between earlier international conflicts and the Nanking 
Atrocity:       
The war is set in the context of a Japanese imperial design to conquer China, going 
back to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and proceeding through the Manchurian 
incident of 1931, growing tensions in Shanghai and northern China, and leading to 
the opening of full-scale war in 1937….This new patriotic version devotes far more 
space to a detailed description of the Nanjing massacre including graphic accounts 
of atrocities there and elsewhere in China. It poses a discussion subject for students: 
‘Japanese rightwing forces vigorously deny that the Japanese military committed the 
Nanjing Massacre—the ultimate act of human cruelty—during its invasion of China. 
                                                             
95 Sneider, “Textbooks and Patriotic Education,” 41.  
96 Sneider, “Textbooks and Patriotic Education,” 46. 
97 Sneider, “Textbooks and Patriotic Education,” 47.  
65 
 
They consider it a type of wartime behavior. What do you think of the issue?’98 
       
The revised, campaign-approved history textbook not only devotes greater 
attention to analysis and contextualization of the Atrocity, but it also frames this 
information in a manner that questions the Japanese response to the events. Thus, 
Chinese educational discourse regarding the Atrocity has evolved from few but victor 
narrative depictions during the Communist era to modern interpretations that emphasize 
Chinese suffering and Japanese silence. 
Japanese Educational Discourse 
Perhaps as a result of such framing, the nature of Japanese education regarding 
the Nanking Atrocity has been a topic of international debate since the 1980s. In 
“Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant: The Rape of Nanking in Japanese High-School 
Textbooks,” Christopher Barnard examines these debates, arguing that “….the Rape of 
Nanking has become one of the main foci of ideological struggle between those who 
want Japan to give a frank accounting of its past and apologise [sic] appropriately, and 
those who maintain the war was justified and the atrocities no more than of the type that 
are likely to occur in all wars.”99 While the textbook debates effectively serve as a sub-
argument within the larger context of international Nanking discourse, research 
concerning this topic provides valuable insight as to the role of each nation in using 
educational tools to address its history. As Sneider notes, this attempt to overcome past 
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wrongdoings through education is exemplified in the postwar efforts of European nations 
in establishing accurate, inclusive assessments of history: “In the postwar period in 
Europe, former combatants such as France and Germany, and Germany and Poland, have 
formed joint commissions to write common textbooks with the goal of removing a source 
of future conflict.”100 In contrast, Japan and China lack this international agreement as to 
proper treatment of the Nanking Atrocity in educational texts. Rather, Japan has been the 
subject of intense international criticism for its revisionist tendencies in school resources:  
For critics, both inside and outside Japan, the content of those textbooks is evidence 
of a failure to take responsibility for the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War or to 
acknowledge the suffering the Japanese military imposed on conquered Asian 
nations and the crimes committed in combat with the Allies.101  
From the perspective of international communities, Japan’s inadequate treatment of 
the past has become a significant obstacle to diplomacy. However, scholars often dispute 
these claims of revisionist aims. In “Far from Oblivion: The Nanking Massacre in 
Japanese Historical Writing for Children and Young Adults,” Matthew Penney notes that, 
even as Chang’s claims of Japanese revisionism were becoming cemented through the 
publication and popularity of her text, straightforward, detailed discussion of the Atrocity 
had already become integrated into Japanese textbooks:  
Despite the recent approval of a pair of middle school textbooks branded ‘far-right’ 
by their critics, there are few signs that this pattern of frank discussion has been 
abandoned. Through most of the postwar period, the Japanese government was not 
willing to have detailed descriptions of the Nanking Massacre included in textbooks. 
One of the trends that paved the way for the inclusion of these types of forthright 
perspectives in officially sanctioned texts in the 1990s was the well-established 
presence of descriptions of the Nanking Massacre, often accompanied by violent 
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images, in popular works aimed at school-age children and young adults. 
Government silences could not withstand the flood of popular publication.102 
         
Encouraged by the influx of supplementary material, Japanese educators in the 
postwar decades gradually introduced discussion of the Atrocity into textbooks. 
Furthermore, in “The Nanking Atrocity and Chinese Historical Memory,” Joshua A. 
Fogel argues that China’s attention to Japanese educational standards is the result of 
careful political manipulation and is less reflective of a genuine interest in Atrocity 
education:       
PRC government leaders like to remind their Japanese counterparts of Japan’s 
heinous wartime acts, usually at face-to-face meetings, and the Japanese government 
usually acquiesces in the interests of continuing this mammoth bilateral trade. In 
order to maintain this strategic card, the PRC regime has tried to keep the Nanking 
issue from imploding among its populace, potentially injuring these lucrative 
Japanese contacts….It must control public expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment by 
orchestrating demonstrations against Japan on other selected issues, such as the 
textbook controversy of the early 1980s, when the Japanese press leaked what 
proved to be inaccurate stories of the Ministry of Education’s plans to soften the 
description of Japanese aggression in World War II.103    
Regardless of the validity of Fogel’s assertion, it remains important to assess the 
nature of Atrocity discussion in Japanese textbooks. In this vein, innumerable works have 
been published on the Japanese treatment of the Nanking Atrocity in history textbooks. 
Through his research, Barnard refutes the generalizing claim that Japanese textbooks 
deny involvement in the Atrocity, although the extent of these discussions is often at least 
somewhat limited. Barnard argues that, although Japanese educational resources 
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generally discuss the events of the Rape of Nanking accurately, there is, to some degree, 
a “glossing over” of the events; Barnard asserts that the Japanese textbooks present this 
information in a manner that “isolates knowledge of the events from Japanese people and 
Japan”104 and that leaves room for interpretation and doubt. This finding is echoed in the 
scholarship of Yi Zou’s, whose article “Historical Narration of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War in Current Japanese High School History Textbooks: The Logic of Its Causal 
Interpretations” explores Atrocity discussion in textbooks as well. From these studies, it 
is clear that the textbook debates are characterized by greater nuance and subtlety than 
the general interpretations of the issue typically denote.      
 For Barnard, linguistic constructions allow the textbooks to address the events of 
the Atrocity without delineating responsibility: “….the perpetrators of the atrocity, 
namely the soldiers of the Imperial Japanese army, are not portrayed by the textbooks as 
being present at Nanking on an individual human level—but are only present on an 
organizational level,”105 which, consequently, means that “….Japanese soldiers, as 
individuals, are never criticized for perpetrating the atrocity.”106 As Barnard’s research 
concludes, there is a significant distinction in the individuality of perpetrators and victims 
as presented in Japanese texts; while victims are described in greater individual detail, the 
perpetrators of the Atrocity, Japanese soldiers, can only be inferred: “….the textbooks 
mention the Japanese army being at Nanking; and, since the Japanese army is made up of 
soldiers, who are Japanese people, one can assume that Japanese people are in the story 
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of the Nanking Massacre. But, nevertheless, this is not the same as ascribing the killing to 
Japanese people.”107 This subtle linguistic framing, according to Barnard, holds 
substantial implications for the reader’s understanding of events. As Barnard explains, 
the distinction between peripherally condemning the actions of an organization and 
frankly condemning the actions of individuals can be understood as the difference 
between stating that the Holocaust was evil, and that the people who perpetrated the 
Holocaust were evil.108 As a result, while Japanese students may be influenced to share a 
critique of the event, there is no collective, national sense of atonement or responsibility.  
 Barnard finds that descriptions of the Atrocity further distance readers from 
perpetrators through the implication that the majority of Japanese society was unaware or 
incapable of altering the events of Nanking. Barnard argues that responsibility is 
delegated in such a manner that Japanese society is largely absolved of the burden of 
having known about the events: “….knowledge of Nanking is located in both space and 
time in such a way that this knowledge is not something that Japanese people are 
depicted as possessing until after the war, and, in fact, the main possessors of this 
knowledge are almost always parties who can be assumed to be anti-Japanese.”109 
Therefore, the language of the textbooks presents a narrative in which the average 
Japanese could not have been knowledgeable of the Nanking Atrocity, as this information 
was withheld by anti-Japanese groups. This narrative of the unknowing and therefore 
irreproachable Japanese public is supported by Barnard’s research. In his analysis of 
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Japanese textbooks, Barnard discusses passages that imply that Japanese public was 
unaware of the Atrocity but that also imply that the entire outside world knew of the 
event. Barnard criticizes this notion as improbable, arguing,    
Was there no ‘governing elite,’ ‘aristocratic elite,’ ‘military elite,’ ‘diplomatic elite,’ 
intellectual elite,’ or ‘media elite’ in Japan who had access to foreign newspapers, 
foreign news services, short-wave radios, foreign acquaintances, accurate 
information from the front in China, and so on, and thereby found out about the 
Rape of Nanking?....[These arguments about the lack ] mean that the people in Japan 
who did know about the atrocity conveniently….have no explaining to do in the 
court of history since they have been swallowed up in the mass of unknowing 
Japanese people.110    
It is difficult to support the argument that the Japanese public was entirely 
unaware of the Atrocity, Barnard asserts, due to the multitude of Japanese sources which 
could have provided this information. Although Nanking Atrocity events are examined 
by Japanese textbooks in greater detail than often credited, sentence-level constructions 
and vague explanations allow authors to delineate blame in such a way that the average 
Japanese reader is separated from any sense of responsibility. In contrast, Barnard’s 
research demonstrates the means by which these texts insulate Japanese society from 
blame by intimating that the typical citizen was prevented from knowing about the nature 
of the Atrocity by outside forces. Ultimately, while Barnard’s findings may reflect a 
general discussion of the Atrocity, his examination also reveals the various intricacies of 
textbook language that prevent a more agentive narrative of the events.   
 Zou’s article similarly presents the complexity of Japanese textbook 
interpretations. While Zou notes that all reviewed texts contained some mention of both 
                                                             
110 Barnard, “Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant,” 526. 
71 
 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Nanking Atrocity111, in some texts, “the 
motivation of the war was purposively diluted, and rationalized by a reasonable 
interpretation.”112 By examining the causality of events as presented in Japanese 
textbooks, Zou reveals the inconsistencies of Nanking discussions in these references. By 
framing the events in a context that rationalizes the Atrocity by relying heavily on causal 
interpretations, Japanese textbooks, according to Zou, inhibit a complete, accurate 
understanding of the nature of Japan’s brutality.       
 As noted by Barnard, Zou, Sneider, and countless other Japanese textbook 
analysts, there is rarely a complete, unilateral avoidance of Atrocity discussion; however, 
there are often crucial topics and details left unexamined by these texts, such as the 
treatment of comfort women. While these texts seem to address, often in candid detail, 
the brutality inflicted upon innocent Chinese civilians, the topic of comfort women does 
not receive similar frankness:  
Contrary to popular belief, Japanese textbooks by no means avoid some of the most 
controversial wartime moments. The widely used textbooks contain accounts, 
though not detailed ones, of the massacre of Chinese civilians in Nanjing in 1937 by 
Japanese forces. The textbooks tend to reflect the arguments among Japanese about 
this event including the issues of the numbers of victims and to what degree the 
massacre was an organized punishment, with racial overtones, of the Chinese. But 
the comfort women issue is dealt with in spare detail, sometimes only in a footnote 
(unlike, for example, the graphic and extensive descriptions offered in Korean 
textbooks).113      
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While brutal treatment of men, women, and children during the Nanking Atrocity 
is generally addressed in textbooks, the controversial topic of Japan’s enslavement of 
both Chinese and Korean women into the sex trade are dealt with sparingly, if at all. 
Scholars have noted this absence and hypothesized its explanation. While there remains 
no clear, singular interpretation of the reasoning, this information, in addition to the 
linguistic nuances explored by Zou and Barnard, further reveals the complexities of the 
Japanese textbook debates.         
 In a comparative analysis of both Chinese and Japanese texts, Sneider argues that 
it is ultimately Chinese texts, rather than Japanese texts, that demonstrate a nationalistic 
presentation of the Atrocity. Through his research, Sneider found that Japanese textbooks 
tend to offer a more generalized discussion of the Atrocity and typically lack the patriotic 
overtones that characterize their Chinese counterparts:     
The study found that Japanese textbooks are relatively devoid of overt attempts to 
promote patriotism and that they contain more information about controversial 
wartime issues such as the Nanjing Massacre than is widely believed. In contrast, 
Chinese textbooks, particularly after their revision a decade ago, are consciously 
aimed at promoting a nationalist view of the past as part of the country’s ‘patriotic 
education’ campaign.114         
While Japanese textbooks may lack the explicitly nationalist messages of the post-
Patriotic Education Campaign resources, Sneider cautions that this straightforwardness 
does not make Japanese educational materials more complete, as evidenced by the 
avoidance of the comfort women topic.115 This frankness in assessment and refrain from 
identification-driven narratives is not limited to events in which Japan served as the 
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primary perpetrator; rather, the extent of this “dry chronology of events”116 is exemplified 
by the lack of social contextualization regarding issues that directly impacted Japanese 
civilians:     
‘Even on the issues in which Japanese were victims (such as atomic bombing and 
Siberian internment), Japanese textbooks remain detached, making no moral 
judgement….This approach to history means that Japanese textbooks read more like  
chronological charts than coherent historical narrative.’117 
Rather than delineate blame in historical conflicts or pursue identification through 
shared trauma, Japanese textbooks, Sneider argues, tend to demonstrate a more 
progressive critique of war generally.118 However, Sneider also problematizes this 
treatment of wartime atrocities, arguing that readers are left without a clear, unambiguous 
means of interacting with the past: 
The impassive neutral nature of Japanese high school history textbooks certainly 
reflects the inability of postwar Japan to resolve its own debate about the wartime 
past. But it also is the product….of the conscious decision of a nation, reflecting on 
its disastrous wartime defeat, to avoid the siren call of sentimental patriotism.119 
        
However, what Sneider views as an intentional distancing from sentimental 
patriotism may, in fact, reflect Barnard’s assessment of Japanese textbooks as 
condemning the event without condemning the parties responsible. Thus, Japanese 
textbooks reflect both a superficial admittance of the events and a sentence-level 
confusion of groups responsible. As a result, these texts dislocate perpetrators and 
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distance readers from the event.         
 The multi-faceted nature of textbook interpretation and scholarship demonstrates 
one of the many obstacles present in the Nanking Atrocity debates. Ultimately, the nature 
of Japan’s treatment of the Atrocity through education holds significant implications for 
international discourse. In order to effectively establish a standardized discussion of the 
events, it is first important to investigate the reality of the textbook debates. Although the 
generalized claim that Japanese textbooks are revisionist in nature is here disputed 
through the invaluable research of scholars, the pervasiveness of this assumption in 
Atrocity debates poses obstacles for the future of international diplomacy. Each country 
continues to use the textbook debates as a platform for addressing more serious, 
foundational issues related to Nanking memory. As a result, these debates often 
accomplish little more than exacerbating international tensions. While there are 
inconsistencies in educational discourse concerning the Nanking Atrocity, this 
unreliability is the result of the inconclusiveness and ambivalence of early post-war 
discussions of the event. Thus, the nature of Atrocity education is reflective of not only 
modern but historical geopolitical influences as well. Educational materials represent 
only one form of Atrocity memory formation in modern society. In addition, as the 
following section will examine, cinematic and literary texts also play a significant role in 
accepting, challenging, and reinforcing interpretations of the event. To determine ways 
that China, Japan, and the U.S. can effectively address and overcome the Atrocity, it is 
necessary to examine the ways that these materials construct narratives and impact public 
memory. 
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Chapter V: Literary and Cinematic Representations 
While textbooks and educational materials reflect what is often perceived to be 
more official memorializations of historical events, more “informal” mediums such as 
literature and cinema also serve to construct, revise, and perpetuate shared narratives. 
These narratives, like those supported in China and Japan’s educational resources, have 
evolved with the changes of geopolitics.        
 In the post-war era, efforts to memorialize the Nanking Atrocity were hampered 
by the physical destruction to publishing centers as a result of the Japanese invasion, the 
Chinese preoccupation with domestic conflicts, and each nation’s efforts to adapt to the 
challenges of modernity. As Michael Berry notes A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern 
Chinese Literature and Film, “Except for a small number of early works written during 
the War of Resistance, the literary history of the Nanjing Massacre is marked largely by 
silence until the sudden reemergence of the incident in political and literary discourses in 
the 1980s,”120 a fact that separates Nanking memorializations greatly from their 
Holocaust counterparts, which comprise an independent genre in literature and film. 
However, since the modern revival in Nanking memory, impacted in large part to the 
proliferation of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking, there has been a surge in literary and 
cinematic representations of the event.       
 Given the significant increase in Nanking depictions in film and literature, it is 
important to determine the ways in which these various texts interpret, revise, and 
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construct Atrocity narratives. Doing so is instrumental in understanding the modern status 
of not only “unofficial” or wider public discourse on the event but even in understanding 
more authoritative interpretations. These secondary interpretations of the Nanking 
Atrocity are invaluable for, as Berry asserts, “Memories, perceptions, and impressions of 
atrocity are often shaped not by the actual events of history but rather by how those 
events are represented, re-created, reconstructed, and, in some cases, deconstructed 
through the lens of popular culture.”121  
Japanese Literature and Films: Disproving or Proving the “Facts” Using Sexual 
Violence 
 Generally, despite cultivating the largest volume of scholarship on the topic, 
Japan produces the least amount of literary and cinematic representations of the Nanking 
Atrocity. The most famous literary representations of the even by Japanese authors come 
not from the modern era of Nanking scholarship, but from the earlier post-war years. 
However, these works do share a thematic similarity with modern left-wing Japanese 
productions. Japanese literary and cinematic representations of the even can thus be 
divided into two categories, goal-oriented toward asserting two separate Nanking 
narratives. These themes include disproving or proving the “facts” of the Atrocity using 
sexual violence as evidence. The first category includes the literary works of such 
acclaimed Japanese authors as Yukio Mishima and Endo Shusaku. Mishima, an 
outspoken writer with a preoccupation with Japan’s glory days of samurai ethics and 
wartime spirit, condemned Japan’s post-WWII concessions and Westernization:  
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Mishima was deeply attracted to the austere patriotism and martial spirit of Japan’s 
past, which he contrasted unfavourably to the materialistic Westernized people and 
the prosperous society of Japan in the post-war era….On November 25, 1970, after 
having that day delivered the final installment of The Sea of Fertility to his 
publisher, Mishima and four Shield Society followers seized control of the 
commanding general’s office at a military headquarters near downtown Tokyo. He 
gave a 10-minute speech from a balcony to a thousand assembled servicemen in 
which he urged them to overthrow Japan’s post-World War II constitution, which 
forbids war and Japanese rearmament. The soldiers’ response was unsympathetic, 
and Mishima then committed seppuku in the traditional manner, disemboweling 
himself with his sword, followed by decapitation at the hands of a follower.122  
Although Mishima’s depiction of Japanese aggressions in “Peonies” did not demonstrate 
an overt sympathy for Chinese rape victims, scholars such as Amanda Weiss deem this 
admission of Japanese sexual violence noteworthy, given the nation’s silence on this 
topic.123 Furthermore, this depiction of Japanese aggression, however unsympathetic to 
the actual suffering it produced, was instrumental in future left-wing cinematic 
representations of Japanese guilt. Considering how closely Mishima’s glorified 
nationalistic view of Japanese militarism mirrors that of modern-day right-wing 
revisionists in Japan, his short story “Peonies” is certainly an outlier not only from his 
other works but from general right-wing romanticized wartime depictions as well. In his 
translator’s note to “Peonies,” Arizona State University professor Anthony H. Chambers 
reconciles this contradiction, stating, “The implied antiwar, antimilitary message of 
‘Peonies’ and its acknowledgement of the realities of war….come from a youthful 
Mishima who had not yet assumed the role and persona for which he is most clearly 
remembered today.”124         
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 The humanness of the flowers is foreshadowed, even before the narrator is aware 
of their symbolic purpose. He feels eerily in the midst of a field of individual peonies, 
each with its own distinctive identity: 
Each peony had its own character. When I looked out over the garden, the sightseers 
standing and squatting here and there obstructed my view; but, nevertheless, the 
peonies, casting heavy shadows one by one on the black soil, were unlike plants in 
full bloom at an ordinary flower garden. Each one, encircled by its own allotment of 
soil, seemed isolated from the rest. The overall impression was one of melancholy. 
The wide-open blooms, far too large for the squat shrubs they adorned, had an eerie 
vividness about them, as if they had just blossomed from the rain-dampened soil.125  
The narrator is unsettled by the peonies and their individuality, noting immediately 
their distinctiveness from ordinary flower gardens. The foreshadowing is continued, as 
Mishima emphasized the personified quality of the flowers through subtle word choice: 
“Stopping before a peony, he stood with his hands folded behind him and stared at the 
flower’s face.”126 Kawamata, the owner and cultivator of the garden, does not interact 
with any of the guests milling about. Rather, he holds almost a silent communication with 
the peonies, staring into each flowers’ “face.” Immediately following this subtle 
observation from the narrator, Kuasada brings this eeriness into full exposure through 
dialogue: “‘Five hundred and eighty plants—or five hundred and eighty persons,’ 
Kuasada said suddenly.”127 Here, the silent truth with Mishima carefully weaved through 
only a few short expository or dialogic notes becomes fully explicit, and the eeriness and 
dread felt be the reader is fully realized. Kuasada provides Kawamata’s backstory, 
hypothesizing the figure’s inherent need for recognition of his wrongdoings: 
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‘According to the war-crime charges, he’s responsible for the massacre of tens of 
thousands. But the number the Colonel killed with his own hands, gladly and 
meticulously, was only five hundred and eighty. Moreover, they were all women. 
The Colonel took a personal interest only in killing women. After becoming the 
owner of this place, Kawamata strictly limited the number of peony plants to five 
hundred and eighty. It’s because he cultivated the flowers with his own hands that 
the peony garden has turned out this well. But what do you make of such a peculiar 
diversion? I’ve been thinking about it, and now I believe I’ve reached the right 
conclusion. He wanted to commemorate, in a secret way, his own evil. He has 
probably succeeded in fulfilling the evildoer’s most compelling need: to exhibit his 
own indelible evil without endangering himself.’128  
Like the narrator, we readers are expected to listen to Kawamata’s story in surprise. 
The story ends with Kuasada’s narration—Mishima reveals nothing about the narrator’s 
reaction. So, then, it cannot be assumed that “Peonies” makes any overt claim about the 
ways in which Kawamata’s actions—either his killing or his commemoration—should be 
judged. Rather, the reader is left with a blank slate for reaction in absence of the guiding 
lens of the narrator’s response to the tale. However, Kuasada’s monologue provides the 
reader with more than objective facts—again, stylistic considerations like word choice 
reveal a deeper interpretation. The flower garden is both a “diversion” and an 
“exhibition”; Kuasada intuits that Kawamata’s hobby gives the appearance of some 
mental or emotional separation from the killings, but, reality, that this act is, on some 
conscious or subconscious level, an exhibition of carefully-orchestrated killings. For 
Kawamata, the artistry of the garden is symbolic of the artistry of these meticulous 
murders. Kuasada openly refers to the killings as evils that are indelible—impervious to 
the corrosive forces of time and forgetfulness. Does Kuasada assume that Kawamata 
wishes these memories of atrocity to be forgotten? In what ways would Kawamata be 
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endangered, and in what ways is he removed from danger by virtue of the garden’s secret 
symbolism? These questions are left unanswered, and Mishima betrays no easy 
interpretation. However, this acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of rape during the 
war, and the realization that Japanese post-war methods of remembering (or 
“commemorating”) are open to reflection and even criticism, reflect a key separation 
from Mishima’s later unreserved, ubiquitous pride in Japanese militarism and serves as 
key inspiration for later left-wing condemnations of Japanese atrocities.  
 Endo Shusaku’s “Scandal” is another work, also by an acclaimed Japanese author, 
that similarly examines Japanese wartime atrocity; however, like in Mishima’s “Peonies,” 
this examination is peripheral and inconclusive. Additionally, Shusaku’s work was 
published much closer to the onset of modern Nanking debates than Mishima’s short 
story. Endo Shusaka is a major twentieth century writer in Japan; his seminal works 
include “Silence,” a novel that follows the story of Christian missionaries and the 
obstacles that they faced in feudal Japan, and “The Sea and Poison,” a novel that paints a 
decidedly negative image of Japanese medical experimentations on POWS, and “The 
Samurai,” a historical novel that follows the adventures of one samurai, who travels in 
pursuit of opening trade routes for his shogun.129130 “Scandal,” published in 1986, 
“features a Japanese woman recalling her husband’s burning of Chinese women and 
children during the war.”131 Despite the minor mention of Japanese aggression in China, 
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Shusaku’s work remains noteworthy for even such a peripheral treatment of the Atrocity.
 Although neither work presents on overt criticism of Nanking, Mishima’s 
“Peonies” and Shusaku’s “Scandal” are noteworthy given their frank treatment of 
Japanese aggression against Chinese, and, in particular, against Chinese women through 
sexual violence. Furthermore, these works are significant by virtue of the near absence of 
Atrocity-related literature or film—even these works only discuss the event peripherally. 
It was not more recently that representations of the events began to appear in Japanese 
cinema, and even then, these works were often created in response to Chinese film 
adaptations. Through cinema, the themes previously introduced are more obviously 
wielded: right-wing cinematic adaptations discount the Nanking Atrocity and pay 
particular attention to denying any evidence of sexual misconduct committed by Japanese 
soldiers, while left-wing films, responding to right-wing representations, depict vividly 
the sexual brutality of the forces in order to “prove” the Atrocity’s existence.  
 No Japanese project is more exemplary of the right-wing Nanking narrative than 
Mizushima Satoru’s proposed, Nanking no Shinjitsu (The Truth about Nanking). 
Mizushima, angered by Chinese, and more recently, American depictions of the Nanking 
Atrocity, has begun planning his own three-part series to reveal the “truth” of the events. 
Mizushima, a director for the right-wing online news publication Channel Sakura and 
writer for the journal Seiro, took fault with the American documentary Nanking and 
immediately announced his own Atrocity project.132 As David McNeill reports in a 
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December 2007 article for the Japan Times, Mizushima’s project has already gained 
support among conservative higher-ups in Japan: 
The documentary is supported by more than a dozen lawmakers….including Nariaki 
Nakayama, an LDP member of the House of Councilors and an education minister 
under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and a panel of academics, 
including Shudo Higashinakano, a history professor at Asia University in Tokyo 
who provides much of its thin intellectual gruel.133 
 Although Mizushima is fairly independent in his aims to undermine Chinese and 
Western representations of Nanking, the open government support of his project is 
disconcerting given the outright denial that his works present. So far, only the first and 
last installments of the three-part series have been produced; the first section, devoted to 
the Tokyo Trials, was released as a film under the title The Truth of Nanking: Seven 
Condemned Criminals in 2007.134 The third section, The Truth of Nanking 1937, was 
developed as a manga.135 In her article, “Contested Images of Rape: The Nanjing 
Massacre in Chinese and Japanese Films,” scholar Amanda Weiss summarizes the plot of 
The Truth of Nanking: 
 Truth is a litany of right-wing conspiracy theories and xenophobia loosely 
constructed around the making of a Hollywood film on Nanjing—an imagined 
alternative to 2007’s Nanking. While preparing a documentary about Iris Chang, 
American producer/director Dan Shiotsuki and actress Anna Kinski encounter a sea 
of Chinese propaganda, lies, and intimidation. Female Chinese spies and female 
Chinese American machinations compromise Dan and Anna’s ‘search for truth’ at 
every turn. Their ultimate ‘discovery’: Nanjing simply didn’t happen, and the real 
victims were the Japanese soldiers executed after the postwar trials.136 
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 Appropriating the Chinese thematic device of the “discovery” or “proving” of 
Nanking in films about the event, Mizushima effectively turns this element on its head: 
now, the earnest search for truth by Americans Shiotsuki and Kinski result in the 
revelation that the Nanking Atrocity is a myth constructed through Chinese nationalistic 
propaganda. By making the fictional documentary about Chang, the most vocal modern 
proponent of Nanking awareness, Mizushima is able to undermine one of the 
conservative revisionists’ greatest challengers. Through their honest efforts to find the 
truth about Nanking and Chang, Shiotsuki and Kinski are validated and are viewed as 
credible; this credibility makes their ultimate realizations about the Atrocity and about 
Chang even more believable and horrific—her ethos is effectively decimated. Weiss 
examines the ways that these critical depictions of Chang are inextricably linked to one of 
the film’s underlying messages concerning the duplicity of Western and Chinese women, 
the very same groups that claim Japanese sexual violence: 
Truth constructs the Nanjing issue as an attack on Japanese masculinity, addressing 
its invective toward women. In a revealing appropriations of the meaning of Chang’s 
death (who committed suicide in 2004 after a long struggle with depression), it 
concludes that she killed herself out of shame in realizing that her book was flawed. 
It also attacks her choice to commit suicide, since she was the mother of a young 
(male) child, making a nationalist appeal to motherhood. Throughout, Mizushima 
emphasizes the duplicitous nature of Chinese women and particularly Chinese 
American women, depicting them as prostitutes and spies engaging in ‘honeytrap’ 
plots.137 
 The traditional victim-aggressor narrative, perpetuated by Western and Chinese 
sources, is thereby inverted as Japanese men are subjected to the lures and deceit of 
Chinese and American women. However, if Mishima and Shusaku openly referenced 
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Japanese sexual aggression (without overtly demonstrating sympathy for the victims), 
why does Mizushima go to such lengths to reverse a once-accepted truth of wartime 
violence against women? Weiss presents a possible answer to this question in her 
analysis of the film’s glorification of Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Takeshi, who were 
executed for the 100-man killing contest. Weiss states, “As dignity, honor, racial 
superiority, and self-control are central to the right wing’s mythos of the Yamato hero, 
wartime rape is seen as an affront to their foundational narrative. The film thus aims to 
rescue the honor of the Japanese soldier by denying wartime sexual violence.”138 As the 
admission of this wartime violence may tarnish the purported chivalry and heroism of 
Japanese soldiers (think Japan’s wartime coverage of generosity toward Nanking 
residents) (and certainly, neither Shusaku nor Mishima have such explicitly romanticized 
views of these figures in their works), modern right-wing discussions of the Nanking 
Atrocity must make significant efforts to address and undermine claims of sexual 
violence. In order to depict a heroic narrative of Japanese militarism, figures like 
Mizushima absolve soldiers of any wrongdoing and even depict women as sexual 
aggressors.           
 In response, then, left-wing media makes an overt, conscious effort to emphasize 
narratives of Japanese sexual brutality. By emphasizing Japanese rape of Chinese 
women, and even by depicting Japanese de-masculinization via rape, these left-wing 
productions attempt to not only silence revisionist groups in Japan but to prove, much 
like the Chinese films, the actuality of the event itself. As with right-wing filmmakers, 
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these left-wing groups rely on 20th century literary classics to redefine the Nanking 
debates. One left-wing film, for example, retells the story of on one of Edogawa Rampo’s 
classics, “The Caterpillar.” Rampo, a famous crime and mystery novelist, used grotesque 
imagery throughout his writing to shock readers—the origins of his dark, gothic style are 
credited in his pseudonym, which is meant to sound like “Edgar Allen Poe.”139 Grotesque 
and dark imagery abound in his short story, “The Caterpillar.” In this work, a decorated 
Japanese war hero, Lieutenant Sunaga, returns to his wife, Tokiko, severely deformed, 
having lost all limbs and senses but sight. Although his wife initially serves her husband 
dutifully, she becomes increasingly more disgusted with his helplessness and deformity, 
considering his appearance monstrous and subhuman: 
 The left ear was entirely gone, and only a small black hole showed where it had 
once been. From the left side of his mouth across his cheek to beneath his eyes there 
was a pronounced twitch like a suture, while an ugly scar also crept across his right 
temple up to the top of his head. His throat caved in as if the flesh there had been 
scooped out, while his nose and mouth retained nothing of their original shapes.140  
Rampo’s descriptions of Sunaga, viewed through the perspective of Tokiko, are 
truly grotesque. Growing tired of caring for the helpless Sunaga, Tokiko begins to treat 
her husband sadistically, mocking and manipulating his now-unsatiable sexual urges and 
derives an almost sexual pleasure from the act of mistreating her husband. The physical 
disfigurement of the war hero, then, is mirrored by the moral disfigurement of his wife.  
 Notably, the story does not take place after the Second Sino-Japanese War but in 
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the years following the Russo-Japanese war. Furthermore, Rampo offers no explicit 
condemnation of Sunaga’s wartime actions (Sunaga’s experiences are not disclosed at 
all), the de-masculinization and complete physical disfigurement of Sunaga seems to 
imply an inversion of the standard “war hero” narrative. In her Reuters review of the 
film, writer Maggie Lee examines these elements, stating, 
Significantly politicizing and humanizing Edogawa Rampo’s 1929 horror-fantasy 
short story of entomological sexual instinct (banned from reprinting in 1939), his 
focus is on war’s impact on the civilian psyche and the hypocrisy of ‘patriotic duty,’ 
expressed through a woman’s sadomasochistic relationship with her husband after 
he is horribly maimed in battle. The original setting the Russo-Japanese War, from 
which Japan emerged victorious, is transposed to WWII, which ended in defeat.141  
In direct response to right-wing filmmakers, directors such as Koji Wakamatsu 
employ the same tactic of using literary classics to retell the history of Nanking. Left-
wing efforts further reflect their right-wing counterparts, as Wakamatsu, like 
Mizhushima, is recognized for his controversial productions. Prior to Caterpillar, 
Wakamatsu produced United Red Army, a critique of Japanese left-wing extremists.142 
Although the work received some backlash, Wakamatsu’s pair films Caterpillar and 
United Red Army demonstrate a fair critique and appraisal of both political extremes in 
Japan. In Caterpillar, Wakamatsu undermines traditional visions of nationalistic, 
militaristic heroism by turning the classical “war hero” into a sexually frustrated invalid:  
Caterpillar relates the downfall of the barbarous Lietuenant Kurokawa [Sunaga], a 
sexually abusive husband, rapist, and murderer. Kurokawa is horribly maimed 
during a battle in China and returns home mute, quadriplegic, and completely reliant 
on his wife Shigeko [Tokiko]. The townspeople revere Kurokawa as a ‘god of war,’ 
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whom Shigeko consents to nursing as the ‘wife of a god of war.’ Later, she tires of 
this arrangement and begins to mock his manner of speaking, parade him in front of 
others, and even rape him. Thus victimized by a woman, Kurokawa is haunted by 
the Chinese woman he murdered and eventually commits suicide.143  
Thus distorting the typical image of the Japanese war hero, Wakamatsu inverts the 
traditional perception of the Nanking Atrocity by making the aggressors victims (albeit 
unsympathetic ones) in their own right. Furthermore, the sexual violence that Kurokawa 
endures under his wife’s sadistic nursing leads him to reflect on his own brutalization of 
Chinese women during the war. Here, the common thematic device of sexual violence, 
depicted in both right-wing and left-wing Japanese films, is fully emphasized. As Eric 
Kohn notes in his film review for Indie Wire, Wakamatsu’s directorial choices force 
viewers to confront the reality of Japanese sexual violence during the war, a carefully 
avoided topic in Japanese Nanking discussions, education, and cinematic representations: 
From its opening minutes, Wakamatsu announces his intention of dismantling 
militarist propaganda. Newsreel footage of Japanese attacks suddenly turns real, 
following the pre-mutilated Tadashi into a Chinese home where he brutally rapes a 
shrieking woman, while triumphant music plays in the background. Tadashi’s later 
appearance furthers this ironic juxtaposition of celebration and cruelty, as he 
becomes the de facto face of Japanese strength despite having none himself.144  
In this adaptation of Rampo’s tale, the aggressor becomes victim of not only the 
ravages of war but of sexual violence himself. Weiss examines the ways in which 
Wakamatsu’s film invert typical narratives of Japanese rape of Chinese women by having 
the victims stare defiantly at the audience, willing the audience to recognize the reality 
and extent of Japanese atrocity:  
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 Caterpillar also reverses the gaze by having female victims look back at the rapists. 
The film begins with Kurokawa’s rape and murder of a Chinese woman. Her 
accusing eye looks directly at the camera lens, the film slowly fading to an image of 
the Japanese flag. The red circle of the hinomaru replaces her eye, indicting the 
Japanese nation for her murder.145 
Furthermore, by becoming a powerless rape victim himself, Kurokawa must also 
recognize the Chinese victim’s (and Shigeko’s) perspective and the consequences of his 
brutality: 
Shigeko’s reversal of male violence likewise negates Japanese militant masculinity 
and avenges the Chinese woman’s death…..Kurokawa suddenly sees himself from 
the perspective of the Chinese woman he killed in the first scene, surrounded by her 
screams. Yet it is not simply a reversal, for Shigeko has also been traumatized by 
rape and is reliving her traumatic past, as well as appropriating Kurokawa’s 
violence.146  
In a society that primarily denies Japanese rape or the establishment of “comfort 
women” during the Second Sino-Japanese war, Wakamatsu’s open depiction of 
Kurokawa’s sexual violence and sexual victimization both asserts the reality of the 
Nanking Atrocity and the proliferation of Japanese rape of Chinese women while de-
masculinizing the mythic image of militaristic heroism, an ideal which Weiss notes is 
inextricably linked to masculinity in the Japanese mentality: 
Caterpillar makes an astute observation: the nationalism of the right is based on 
male power and female subordination and has been consistently so, form the 
imperial era to the present, albeit in deifferent ways toward women of different 
nationalities…..In attacking the right’s masculinity, [the film exposes] a consistent 
attitude of nationalist ideology and the dangers at the core of this xenophobic 
misogyny.147  
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 Thus, while Mizushima’s The Truth of Nanking demonstrates the ways in which 
conservative Japan uses the absence of Japanese sexual violence against Chinese women 
as evidence against the existence of the Atrocity, Caterpillar reveals the ways that left-
wing groups similarly politicize the female body in order to assert their Nanking 
narrative.  
Chinese Literature and Films: Proving the Facts and Assigning Blame  
Since the early years of the post-war era and even during the Japanese occupation 
of major cities, Chinese authors sought to record the events of the war. As is noted in the 
early postwar text, China: After Seven Years of War, maintaining and even improving the 
proliferation of Chinese novels, short stories, poems, and plays was a key goal of literary 
groups and individual writers alike during this time. The text lauds the literary movement 
as a nationalistic effort that democratized literature and made the experiences of lower 
classes more accessible to the separate community of writers:  
Chinese writers have been endeavoring to produce a new literature out of the turmoil 
of tears and blood. They have used literature as a weapon of education and 
propaganda to mobilize the people for war. They have composed plays and stories 
portraying soldiers, farmers, and the rest of the common people. They have come 
out of their attics and ivory towers to see the people and to see what is happening. 
Before the war most writers lived in large cities, such as Peiping and Shanghai, and 
knew little about the people; for the Chinese are a people of the farms, the villages, 
and the market towns. In occupying the coastal cities the Japanese compelled the 
writers to move to the interior, where they have met the people.148   
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Truly, as the authors of China: After Seven Years of War assert, the Japanese 
invasion provided writers with an almost ideal opportunity to revitalize the literary 
culture of China and to unify under the shared banner of national pride and resistance:  
Chinese writers do war work under the banner of the National Writers 
Antiaggression Association, organized in Hankow in 1938, of which Lao Sheh has 
been the most enthusiastic supporter. Before the war, they were divided into two 
major groups, King Pai and Hai Pai (literally, Peking School and Shanghai School). 
The groups looked down upon each other and never cooperated. The war has swept 
away such differences, and writers now have only one thing in mind—to help the 
nation to defeat Japan.149  
The authors admit the shortcomings of Eastern literature, noting that the style of 
Chinese writers may not have caught up to that of western writers. However, they 
maintain that Chinese literature serves an important social purpose during the war and 
that Chinese writers can become ennobled through their efforts to unite the public: 
In an article entitled ‘The Literary Policy We Need,’ Chang Tao-fan, chairman of 
the Central Cultural Movement Committee of the Kuomintang Party, writes that 
literature should no longer be directed to the leisure class but should help to win the 
war by mobilizing the people. It should reflect the Chinese way of life and the 
Chinese philosophy of love, equality, sacrifice, and patriotism.150 
As a text published in 1945, China: After Seven Years of War demonstrates the 
earliest interpretations of wartime literature. These works served the key purpose of 
building and maintaining national pride and resistance, just as journalistic coverage in 
this era sought to frame news in the most optimistic and patriotic lens. By encouraging 
Chinese resistance and uniting different groups across the country, the writers of China: 
After Seven Years of War recognized that literary efforts were essential to the war, even 
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calling these works “weapons.” This call for nationalistic works influenced the tone of 
wartime literature and the ways in which events like Nanking factored into the national 
memory.          
 However, despite the efforts of writers during the wartime and early post-war 
years, there were few texts that specifically discussed the Nanking Atrocity—likely 
because the initial interpretation of the event was that it was not uniquely distinct from 
the other atrocities committed by Japan during the war. So, the majority of Nanking texts 
were not created until the 1980s, when changes in geopolitics drew public attention to the 
historical context of Chinese-Japanese relations.       
 The first major work detailing the Atrocity was Ah Long’s Nanjing. Writer Chen 
Shoumei, pen name Ah Long, served in the army and fought in Shanghai, where he was 
seriously wounded. As he recovered, he drafted not only the first compilation of 
journalistic reports about the war, but “the first Chinese literary work to attempt to 
narrate the atrocities of the Nanjing Massacre.”151 Although, as Berry notes in a footnote, 
Tatsuzo Ishikawa’s collection of interview material with Japanese soldiers, Living 
Soldiers was actually released in 1938, a year earlier. The work was quickly suppressed 
by censors, although Berry notes that Long was familiar with the text and referenced it in 
his own writing.          
 As the earliest work detailing Japanese atrocities in Nanking, Ah Long’s 
interpretation of the events are invaluable; the national importance of the text led to its 
recognition by the Chinese National Arts and Literature Anti-Japanese Committee, a 
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group that conferred on Long the award of best novel. However, the delayed publishing 
of the text (released only after Long’s death in 1987) suggests a conflicting national 
interpretation of Long’s work. While publication was delayed in part due to the 
challenges posed by the Japanese invasion, concerns about the unfavorable depictions of 
Chinese militarism also impacted the work’s dissemination.152 Furthermore, as Berry 
notes, Long was a political target during the Communist regime for his theoretical works 
and supposed membership in the counterrevolutionary group, the “Hu Feng Clique.”153 
Finally, two decades after Long’s death, his novel Nanjing underwent “some ‘necessary’ 
revisions and [was] refitted with the new title Nanjing Bloody Sacrifice (Nanjing 
xueji)”154 and was finally published in 1987. Sharing a common trait with many future 
Nanking Atrocity works, Ah Long’s work sometimes blurs distinctions between fiction 
and nonfiction, as his writing freely mixes the true experiences of survivors with fictional 
stories. Furthermore, as Berry notes, “the long, detailed descriptions of war strategy and 
historical facts, combined with a general lack of heroes or even main characters, point 
away from traditional conceptions of narrative fiction.”155 The immediacy of the 
historical events are evidenced, therefore, through the generic considerations of the novel. 
By implementing Nanking tales that would have been circulating as he began writing, 
Long’s novel compiles and repurposes Nanking memories.    
 Nanjing is distinct as a Nanking text not only for its immediacy but also for its 
overall message: while later film and novels in the 1980s would condemn the Japanese 
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atrocities committed, Long’s writing selects Chinese compatriots as the target of criticism 
instead. As Berry explains, Long’s lack of any singular protagonist to guide interpretation 
amidst the chaos of so many supporting characters serves to enhance this criticism of the 
Chinese: “These unfavorable descriptions are gradually developed with the introduction 
of more characters, and Nanjing is transformed into a forum for introspective and often 
scathing criticism of the Chinese national character.”156 Long’s concerns of Chinese 
military actions and hypernationalism were responsive to the Nationalist’s Scorched-
Earth Policy:  
Although often overlooked by contemporary historians (especially in China), the 
Scorched-Earth Policy had a widespread impact. In fact, one reporter from The New 
York Times estimated the damage by these incidents of “Chinese military 
incendiarism’ at $20 to $30 million. Ah Long is perhaps the only Chinese author to 
highlight the detrimental effects of this policy and its implications in a larger cultural 
context.157 
  The notion of national character was not revolutionary; as Chapter 4’s 
examination of wartime reporting demonstrates, the U.S., China, and Japan all used 
“national character” arguments in order to unify national sentiments and encourage 
resistance. However, Long significantly uses these same arguments to condemn his 
former comrades, or, at least, his fellow nationals. Berry conceptualizes this inversion of 
“national character” arguments as Long asserting the “unthinkable” consideration that 
internal ethics and behavior poses a greater threat to Chinese society than external 
enemies.158         
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 Criticisms of the Chinese “national character” were constructed through both 
military and civilian figures. Long presents a clear illustration of Chinese deficiencies 
through characters that fear war and bloodshed and who are unempathetic of their fellow 
civilians to the point of exerting violence. As Berry notes, the cacophonous image of 
Nanking is displayed through the myriad of characters, linguistic techniques such as 
onomatopoeia, and evocations of literary tradition via references to cannibalism à la Lu 
Xun’s “The Diary of a Madman”: “Cannibalism and madness, the two dark tenants of Lu 
Xun’s canonical treatise “Diary of a Madman,” are here articulated in the most certain 
terms, even in a disturbingly literal way.”159 Ah Long’s critique of the Chinese “national 
character” therefore employs both new and borrowed imagery to assert the unavoidable 
chaos of the war and the disharmonious and unified nature of Chinese war efforts.  
 It is easy to recognize, then, why Long’s work received backlash. By creating a 
narrative for the Nanking Atrocity that problematized the Chinese “national character,” 
Long not only condemned those present during the war but indicted the whole of Chinese 
society. Furthermore, Long’s criticism is problematic not only in the early post-war era of 
national disunity but even during the modern era as well, as Berry argues in A History of 
Pain: 
 This revision of traditional views of the massacre opens up a new set of problems 
seldom explored, not simply because Nanjing is alternately both patriotic and highly 
critical of the Chinese but also because Ah Long’s depiction of the military battle, 
although patriotic in spirit, runs the risk of lessening the perceived severity of the 
massacre and adding fuel to Japanese revisionist arguments.160  
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However, despite the issues posed by Long’s interpretation of the Nanking 
Atrocity, it is not impossible to glean a hint of optimism in his writing. Some readers 
point to the novel’s epilogue as a potential source of this reading, often criticizing what 
seems, from a modern view, like a forced positivity: “From our perspective, Ah Long’s 
conclusion, not with the brutal displays of rapes and murders in the Nanjing Massacre but 
with the Nationalist victory at Wuhu feels tacked on, even though at the time of writing 
the events at Wuhu may have signaled a genuine optimism.”161 Rather than this 
“obligatory optimism of ‘national defense literature,’ or guofang wenxue,” Berry suggests 
a more appropriate ending found in the final chapter before the epilogue, in a fleeting 
moment of human empathy shared by a Japanese soldier and his Chinese opponent: 
Only at the conclusion of the novel proper, just before Ah Long’s epilogue, is there a 
somewhat enigmatic portrait of a Japanese that presents a fleeting glimmer of hope. 
Or does it? The confusing and contradictory symbols and emotions mark the 
complex and contradictory sentiments throughout the novel—and in war itself.’162  
This inconclusive moment of uncertainty and fear demonstrates the very human 
depiction of war that Long’s novel presents—the writing even prevents a clear reading of 
Long’s personal interpretations. Unfortunately, Long’s vision was rejected in the 
generalization of Nanking Atrocity memories during the 1980s and he suffered 
immensely under the persecution of the Communist regime, a persecution that actualized 
Long’s fears of “the cannibalistic enemy within.”163      
 Long’s Nanjing serves as a useful landmark to gauge other Atrocity works. 
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Whether by intention or accidentally, Long’s critical examination of Chinese “national 
character” as a method of interpreting the Atrocity established a genre of sorts. While 
modern Nanking memorializations in literature and film would suggest that Long’s view 
was comparatively independent in its critiques, there are other writers that share this same 
lens of analysis.          
 Although written several decades after Long’s recorded conceptions of Nanking, 
Ye Zhaoyan’s Nanjing 1937: A Love Story is another important text that falls under the 
category of unfavorable depictions of the Chinese “national character.” Like Long’s 
Nanjing, Zhaoyan’s works is a cacophony of human interactions that demonstrate the 
inexplicable nature of the Nanking Atrocity. As Berry notes, the complex and 
contradictory nature of the story is apparent in the novel’s title: 
First published in 1996, Nanjing 1937: A Love Story is perhaps Ye Zhaoyan’s most 
ambitious project to date….Starting with its title, the novel is a literal contradiction 
in terms. On the eve of the 1937 Rape of Nanjing, one of the most horrid moments 
in modern Chinese history, how could there be such a thing as love or romance? In 
this contemporary take on the Mandarin Duck and Butterfly novel, traditional 
dichotomies of love and war are juxtaposed (and sometimes blurred), creating a 
unique literary vision where history is romanticized and love is militarized.164 155 
The Mandarin Duck and Butterfly genre is amorphous, defying easy definition. An 
oversimplified definition of the genre would suggest a similarity with romance novels in 
which characters are happily coupled, as pairs of ducks or butterflies, by the end of the 
work.165 By locating the action of the narrative within the chaos of the Nanking Atrocity, 
Zhaoyan’s work seems to challenge such an easy, complete conclusion. Zhaoyan uses 
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parallel narratives of love and war to demonstrate the disruptive forces of war, as his 
“romantic vision of the thriving capital city is matched with passages in which militaristic 
terminology is appropriated to describe romantic episodes.”166 Within this confused 
context of love and war, Zhaoyan initiates his critique of Chinese society. He inverts 
accepted hero or victim narratives of the war, and presents the human inadequacy and 
fallibility of both soldiers and civilians: 
Ye’s Nanjing is a world where notions of popular culture are (re)inscribed onto—
and sometimes in place of—more traditional historical narratives….Chinese fighter 
pilots are remembered not for their heroic deeds in the air but rather for their 
superstitious bedside manners. Likewise, with the exception of two minor Japanese 
characters who express typically nationalist sentiments in support of the war effort, 
even the traditional ‘villains’ of the Nanjing Massacre—the Japanese people 
themselves—are portrayed in a very unorthodox manner.167   
Despite the proliferation of Chinese journalistic reports and fictional texts that 
assert a monolithic Japanese “national character,” Zhaoyan’s depictions of Japanese 
soldiers show them to be more sympathetic civilians who display none of the typical 
backwards features of the supposed Japanese monolith. Rather than emphasize the 
brutality of Japanese aggressors, Zhaoyan, like Long, demonstrates the horrible 
manifestations of Chinese violence: “Although he shies away from graphic illustrations 
of the Rape of Nanjing, he does not exercise the same restraint when depicting acts of 
violence committed by Chinese characters upon their compatriots.”168 As Berry notes, 
one of the most violent images in A Love Story is Monk’s acts of murder and necrophilia. 
Monk, a somewhat humorous Chinese character, obsessively pursues a young female, 
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Little Moon. With detailed description, Zhaoyan illustrates Monk’s murder and rape of 
Little Moon, thereby demonstrating the extent of Chinese-on-Chinese violence.   
        However, while Berry notes 
that these depictions of Chinese aggression and sexual violence echo the sentiments of Lu 
Xun and Ah Long, he ultimately asserts that Zhaoyan’s work avoids the didacticism of 
works like Nanjing: 
 ….unlike Ah Long, Ye Zhaoyan is not one for moralizing, and Nanjing 1937’s 
complex combination of satire and sentimentality leads many readers onto a 
tightrope between loving and loathing his characters. And while Ah Long’s 1939 
references to symbolic cannibalism and indigenous violence turned out to be 
tragically prophetic, Ye Zhaoyan’s 1996 literary injection of Chinese-Chinese 
violence can be read as a mere footnote to a century of violent political movements, 
state insurrections, purges, and atrocities at the hands of their own people.169  
The separate historical contexts in which the works were written, according to 
Berry, reveal the separate motivations behind these negative depictions of a Chinese 
“national character.” Berry therefore takes up a generally-held scholarly view that 
Chinese literary and cinematic interpretations of Nanking created after the major 
Communist era events (including civil war, famine, and the Cultural Revolution) cannot 
be extracted from the political dissent and dissatisfaction of the writers. Regardless of 
Zhaoyan’s political sentiments, his work serves as a companion piece to Ah Long’s under 
the general thematic similarity of internally-directed criticism.     
 In contrast to these works, the surge of cinematic depictions of the Nanking 
Atrocity throughout the 1980s and 90s generally abandoned this critique of Chinese 
society or “national character” in lieu of a more unifying interpretation of the event. 
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Explanation for the proliferation of Chinese victimization narratives in recent decades 
can be attributed to changes in geopolitics, as many scholars, including Ning An, Chen 
Liu, and Hong Zhu in their article, “Popular Geopolitics of Chinese Nanjing Massacre 
Films: A Feminist Approach,” argue; the many films created in the 80s, 90s, and 00s, 
such as Do Not Cry, Nanking (1995), Black Sun (1995), The Christ of Nanking (1995), 
and In the Name of the Emperor (1998), Nanjing (2007), The Rape of Nanking (2007), 
Purple Mountain (2008), Christmas in Nanjing: 1937 (2008), John Rabe (2009), City of 
Life and Death (2009), and The Flowers of War (2011), were created in “direct response 
to territorial conflicts that arose between China and Japan in these years.”170 An et al. 
assert that, in response to conflicts arising between China and Japan in more recent years, 
Nanking Atrocity films are “used as cultural representations to form Chinese identities, 
build the national honour of China and the Chinese people, and produce images of an 
enemy of China (Japan).”171 Through a study of Nanking films, An et al. examine the 
ways that gendered narratives are used to construct these interpretations of the Atrocity. 
As in Japanese left-wing films, many Chinese Nanking representations use sexual 
violence against women as a key appeal to both pathos and logos, encouraging viewer 
empathy and serving to prove to existence of the Atrocity.      
 The authors explain the ways in which individual emotive reactions to the 
Nanking films lead to the formation of more collective interpretations through social 
media. As reviewers discuss their reactions to the film and the political nature of the 
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depictions, a collective sense of feeling is built through the approval and perpetuation of 
these comments by fellow social media users: 
Affected by the gendered narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the individual 
emotions of hatred, anger, mercy, and love are evoked; at the same time, such 
emotions are employed to establish the binary identity of the Chinese ‘us’ and the 
Japanese ‘other’ in both ‘reel-life’ and real-life through the cross-scale processing. 
In so doing, a Chinese national identity and an anti-Japanese attitude are 
disseminated and legitimated among the public.172  
The research of An et al. can therefore by used to examine the ways that the female 
body is used throughout Chinese Nanking narratives and the ways that the pathological 
appeals of these narratives encourages perpetuation. However, in order to more fully 
comprehend the nuances of these narratives, it is necessary to examine the various 
thematic devices employed throughout the genre. Thus, like its Japanese counterparts, 
Chinese literary and cinematic representations of the Atrocity can be categorized 
thematically. One category, “Proving the Atrocity and Assigning Blame,” has already 
been exemplified through the works of Long and Zhaoyan. Both authors not only verified 
the Atrocity through depictions but also delineated blame—perhaps not for the event in 
its entirety, but at least for the surrounding chaos of nationalist fervor. This category of 
proving the Atrocity is disproportionately represented in Nanking films in comparison to 
a secondary, although still employed, theme: depicting humanity through Sino-Japanese 
romance.           
 As Ah Long’s Nanjing demonstrates, many works that discuss the Atrocity tend 
to blur the distinctions between history and fiction. However, while Long’s novel only 
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incidentally “proves” the event (given its temporal proximity to the actual events), the 
more modern surge in Nanking cinema makes a more overt, conscious effort to provide 
support for the actuality of the event. As Berry notes, many Atrocity films are indeed 
documentaries, though dramas and more obviously fictionalized works are becoming 
increasingly popular: 
Although much of the body of film on the Nanjing Massacre has been produced in 
the documentary mode, such as Peter Wang’s Magee’s Testament, the PRC 
produced The Massacre of Nanjing—The Surviving Witnesses (Nanjing datusha—
Xingcunzhe de jianzheng), and Christine Choy and Nancy Tong’s In the Name of the 
Emperor, there were also three full-length dramas representing the Nanjing 
Massacre produced between 1987 and 1995.173  
There exist a few key reasons why these dramatic Nanking films will be examined 
in this chapter and documentaries (such as The Rape of Nanking, despite potential factual 
inaccuracies) will, for the most part, be overlooked. In his own scholarship, Berry 
presents one reason why examining fictionalized texts is crucial: 
Although the painfully tragic black and white images of brutalized Chinese children 
taken by John Magee during the massacre and other footage filmed by the Japanese 
themselves, obtained after the allied victory, have become virtually ingrained on the 
Chinese collective unconscious through their continual reuse in a series of 
pedagogical documentaries, it is arguably the trio of dramatic features produced 
between 1987 and 1995 that have reached the widest Chinese audience in recent 
years. These three films serve not only as cinematic depictions of the Rape of 
Nanjing, but also as a means of recreating that tragic historical moment in the 
context of popular culture.174  
Breadth of influence is therefore an important consideration in examining 
fictionalized representations of the Atrocity. However, there are other important factors 
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as well. Documentaries give the weighty perception of officiality (regardless of whether 
this perception is valid), while openly dramatized depictions reveal more unofficial, 
personal, or idealized visions of the Atrocity. Furthermore, this thesis does not to prove 
or disprove elements or the entirety of the Atrocity—for that reason, secondary sources, 
which more effectively demonstrate the general evolution of Nanking memory and 
scholarship than primary sources, have been disproportionately referenced. These sources 
provide insight as to the ways that the Atrocity is remembered and the ways that those 
memories are subjected to criticism, political influences, and cultural trends. Thus, 
unofficial, fictionalized texts will be prioritized in this section.   
 Generally, these unofficial interpretations of the Atrocity tend to adhere to fairly 
standard molds. As Berry notes in A History of Pain, scholarship on Nanking films has 
ascertained and analyzed many of these various interpretive templates, such as the film’s 
focus: 
PRC film critic Zhang Xuan has noted three distinct ways in which filmmakers have 
approached (or proposed to approach) the Rape of Nanjing: 1) to deal with the 
incident from the perspective of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, 2) to looks at the 
Massacre from the perspective of the foreigners at the International Safety Zone, and 
3) to present the perspective of an average Nanjing family.175 
The rhetorical efficacy of these three frames is clear—the Tokyo Tribunals frame 
emphasizes the drama of the trials, a platform through which the Atrocity and Japanese 
aggression was seemingly legitimized; similarly, the “objective foreigner” also provides a 
verification and outside judgement of the events; the average civilian perspective frame, 
employing the greatest appeals to pathos, humanizes and makes relevant the tragedies of 
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Nanking. The first popular cinematic depiction of the Atrocity, Massacre in Nanjing, 
exemplifies not only the “Proving the Atrocity” thematic category but Xuan’s framing 
categories as well: 
Luo Guanqun’s film, Massacre in Nanjing, the first major motion picture to depict 
the event, falls somewhere between Zhang Xuan’s second and third categories….the 
film was awarded the 1987-88 Ministry of Film & Broadcasting award for 
Outstanding Picture and the 1991 Tokyo World Peace Film Festival award for best 
drama, which was a surprising recognition, in light of the sensitivity of the subject 
matter in Japan.176  
Like Zhaoyan and Long’s literary representations, Massacre in Nanjing employs 
the same technique of perspectival diversity; however, in complete contrast to these 
earlier texts, the film ultimately presents a more favorable depiction of Chinese 
characters: 
Although the ensemble cast of characters [in Massacre in Nanjing] all come from 
different social and economic classes, during the ensuing chaos of the massacre, the 
lives of these very different individuals cross paths in a tragic, yet markedly 
patriotic, way.177  
The plot that unites the various characters is the collective effort to protect 
photographic evidence of Japanese atrocities in Nanking. The theme of “proof” is 
therefore central to the plot of Massacre in Nanjing. This patriotic pursuit of evidence 
unifies the characters, producing an overtly political message of not only the importance 
and reality of the Atrocity but the social value in collectively recognizing and 
commemorating the event. In his writing, Berry perceives this need for evidence and 
recognition tragic: 
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 The true tragedy of the film is that just as the characters portrayed in the film 
struggle to prove that the massacre actually happened (through group photos), so 
Massacre in Nanjing, which was made on the fiftieth anniversary of the tragedy, is 
still struggling with the same issues—only this time, the film itself replaces the 
photographs as the chosen medium.178 
The theme of proof is further evidenced by the title and cinematographic style of 
the film. As Berry notes, the original Chinese title suggests the film’s goal of proving the 
Atrocity: 
 Even the film’s Chinese title, Tucheng zuezheng, a literal translation of which 
would read as something like ‘The City of Massacre—Evidence in Blood,’ hints at 
the underlying intent behind, or rather, transparent in, the film’s narrative. They key 
word here is the final character in the title, zheng, ‘authentication, proof, or 
evidence,’ which points to the series of black and white photos, but also to the film 
itself as a vehicle for proof against the Japanese denial of the event.179  
Furthermore, the black and white style enhances the documentary-like feel of the 
film, giving the fictional plot a more realistic quality. Luo heightens this sense of reality 
in key scenes during the film for the greatest pathological impact. Certain techniques, 
such as “slow-motion, removal of all sound and background music to highlight the 
images, periodic stills, and random insertions of ghostly black and white negative 
snapshots”180 are used to underscore the veracity of the events. In his writing, Berry 
analyzes arguably the most apparent instance of these directorial efforts to maximize 
viewer response, a scene that depicts the brutal massacre at the Chaotian Palace and 
exemplifies the “assigning blame” element of this thematic category:  
The director goes all out in his attempt to pull the viewers’ heartstrings in this scene 
by making all of the capture Chinese soldiers wounded—virtually every one of them 
is wrapped in bloodied bandages. This feeling of victimization is heightened by the 
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inclusion of the crying child, the ultimate symbol of innocence. Luo, however, goes 
one step further by juxtaposing this scene with the sinister laughter of gloating 
Japanese soldiers….Although a powerful tool when used sparingly, Luo Guanqun’s 
overuse of these juxtapositions in the end brings a staged, contrived quality to the 
film.181  
The victims and aggressors of the scene (and therefore, of the Atrocity generally) 
are unequivocally clear. Cinematographic devices such those employed by Luo help 
Nanking films reiterate, without relying on dialogue, the villains of the narrative. 
However, Berry’s critique of these devices is also valid. Through overuse, these tools 
become ineffective and even draw attention to the rhetorical nature of the text. The 
viewer no longer feels that they are forming individual interpretations and conclusions 
based on materials provided by the text, but instead feel constricted within the 
interpretive framework obviously imposed.       
 The political nature of the film is apparent not only in its general plot, 
cinematographic style, and title, but in the narratives of individual characters as well. One 
character arc explores the Sino-Japanese romance between a female Chinese prisoner 
(Liu Jingjing) and her former, pre-war Japanese lover, now oppressor and prison-keeper 
(Li Yuan). In a patriotic display of sacrifice, Jingjing forsakes her former love and the 
photographic evidence of their previous union (a couple’s photo). The treasured photo of 
lost love is, as Berry argues, “not only the direct antithesis of the atrocity photos, around 
which the plot revolves, but by never actually showing the photo (the proof), the 
relationship is negated, thus metaphorically functioning as the negation of Sino-Japanese 
love/friendship.”182 Consequently, Massacre in Nanjing’s Sino-Japanese romance does 
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not fulfill the secondary thematic category of depicting humanity but serves to further the 
patriotic message of the film à la “Jiang Qing’s Cultural Revolution-era (1966-1976) 
model operas.”183          
 Another interesting character arc in Luo’s film revolves around the objective 
bystander role of Katy, who is ultimately entrusted with the photographic evidence. From 
works such as Massacre in Nanjing, the evocation of “the detached ‘witness’ of the 
West” narrative has become an increasingly popularized reading. Although this 
interpretation of Western involvement does not originate in the 1980s Nanking revival, as 
demonstrated by previous chapters, works such as Massacre in Nanjing served to validate 
and reinforce this existing perception of Westerns objectivity and support. Berry 
speculates that this plot element potentially “serves as an attempt to rationalize China’s 
own historical amnesia regarding the Nanjing Massacre,”184 although the fact that the 
objective Westerner narrative predates Luo’s film by several decades seems to undermine 
this reading. However, Berry’s conclusion about the efficacy of this plot device is valid, 
as he claims that “in placing such emphasis upon the legitimizing power of the West 
(through an invented character), the filmmaker simultaneously undercuts his own attempt 
at providing ‘cinematic testimony’ to the massacre.”185    
 Two other 1990s Nanking films that fall under the thematic category of “proving 
the events” and “assigning blame” are Black Sun: The Nanjing Massacre and Don’t Cry, 
Nanking. Both films verify the Atrocity by virtue of their subject-matter; however, Black 
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Sun and Don’t Cry, Nanking employ strikingly different methods to construct this 
narrative of proof. Even the 1995 release of the films was rhetorical in nature, 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Allied victory and the conclusion of the 
Second Sino-Japanese war.186 Furthermore, as Berry notes, the films were “openly 
marketed as a visual commemoration of the event.”187     
 T.F. Mou’s Black Sun “proves” the Atrocity through several key cinematographic 
elements. As with Massacre in Nanjing, Mou employs a documentary-esque style to 
indicate the reality of the atrocity and to emphasize the plot of the film. However, Mou’s 
film does more than simply emulate the thematic qualities of Massacre in Nanjing—he 
all but copies the film’s introductory scenes: 
Basically, the structure is: black and white documentary footage of plans, cut to fire 
imagery, cut to dramatic footage of film proper. The fire imagery is manifested as 
burning flames in Massacre in Nanjing and a candle close up in Black Sun. The 
stunning structural similarities between the formal techniques utilized in the films’ 
respective opening sequences is so striking that one could conjecture that it is more 
than a mere coincidence.188 
The black and white, documentary-style opening emphasizes the reality of the 
events, while fire imagery symbolizes the destruction that occurred in Nanking and 
potentially even the efforts to destroy or subvert Nanking memories. Although this 
strategy is effective in Massacre in Nanjing, the questionable rendition in Mou’s film 
undermines its significance. Furthermore, Mou’s Black Sun is plagued by other efforts to 
give credibility to the events by using shocking, hyper-realistic imagery. Berry notes that 
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the fictional and dramatized elements of the film detract from this effort gain recognition 
for the event: 
The film re-creates a carnival-like spectacle of ‘grisly topics’ such as 
dismemberment, torture, and rape, freely mixing documentary newsreel footage with 
dramatic re-enactments in a style almost identical to [Eric] Schaefer’s description of 
early American atrocity films such as Hitler’s Reign of Terror (1934) and The Love 
Life of Adolph Hitler (1948). It is here that the depictions of blood and gore in Black 
Sun become a double-edged sword—turning away a more serious audience, while 
attracting a new one by nature of its inherent sensationalism.189 
Truly, gore and violence, rather than plot or symbolism, are the primary ingredients 
in Black Sun, a factor that resulted in the film receiving significant criticism, censorship, 
and backlash. Mou chose to underemphasize plot and character in favor of these shock-
value scenes, attempting “to serve as a detached witness to the massacre as it 
chronologically unfolds the events from December 11, 1937 to Christmas Eve.”190 The 
extreme violence depicted in the film prevented it from passing PRC censors, potentially 
due to the recent memories of insurrection at Tiananmen.191 While a balance of gore and 
brutality could have benefitted the film’s efficacy and believability, Black Sun suffers 
from the same fate as Massacre in Nanking’s use of pathos appeals, as overemphasis 
undermines these elements. Ultimately, as Berry notes, the film has gained a cult-
following not for its accurate or historically-significant memorializations of Nanking but 
for its grotesque horror-like qualities.       
 The film is further problematized by another attempt to attribute veracity to the 
events and assign blame to Japanese aggressors by giving real, historical names to the 
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soldier characters. The fictional elements of Black Sun are thereby intermingled 
throughout with hints of historical reality, ultimately confusing the boundaries between 
history and fiction. While this tactic succeeds in clearly delineating responsibility and 
criminality, it also assigns disproportionate importance to the perpetrators of the Atrocity 
rather than the victims: 
….by naming the perpetrators and focusing most of his attention on them (the vast 
majority of dialogue in the film occurs amongst Japanese officials), Mou runs the 
risk of silencing the voices, identities, and ultimately, the humanity of the victims—
the very groups he purports to be dedicating his film to.192 
Ultimately, then, Mou’s efforts to actualize the Atrocity through gory reenactments 
or historical references fail to successfully “prove” the event by virtue of their 
overemphasis. In stark contrast to the style of Black Sun, Wu Ziniu’s Don’t Cry, Nanking 
presents a more optimistic examination of the legacy of the Atrocity, humanizing 
Japanese characters to the point that the character “actually shares the same fate as the 
Chinese”193 and depicting war itself as the true villain in the Nanking narrative. Despite 
the fact that Black Sun, Don’t Cry, Nanking, and Massacre in Nanjing all close with 
captions imparting the (modern Chinese) accepted death toll, only Mou and Luo’s films 
fail to overcome the limitations that proving the Atrocity poses. Berry names this theme 
the “defining strategy” of Nanking films, stating,  
Proof or testimony, jianzheng, is a weighty theme in the artistic discourse of the 
Nanjing Massacre. From documentary films like The Massacre of Nanjing—The 
Surviving Witnesses and Eyewitness to History to feature films like Massacre in 
Nanjing and Black Sun, the seemingly irrepressible urge to return to the scene of the 
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atrocity to ‘witness’ and ‘testify’ to the horrors has become not only a recurring 
trope but, arguably the defining strategy.194 
The prevalence of the theme is apparent in its durability throughout the years. More 
recent films such as Gao Qushu’s 2005 film, The Tokyo Trial, also employs this theme of 
proof. Two additional films released during the 2000s, May & August (2002) and Qixia 
Temple (2005) also “….extended the emphasis on evidence in new directions, partly 
through appropriation of narrative tropes from Holocaust literature and film in an attempt 
to reach a wider audience.”195 However, while May & August reflects the positive 
developments in Nanking cinematic representations, close analysis of Qixia Temple 
reveals a clear repackaging of long-overused tropes.      
 The plot of Qixia Temple directly mimics that of Massacre in Nanjing, as the 
main theme of the film revolves around the attempt to smuggle filmic or photographic 
evidence of the events: “Both films trace the complex journey of photographic or filmic 
evidence from person to person and the human sacrifice and martyrdom that facilitates 
it.”196 However, Qixia Temple goes further than Massacre in Nanjing in projecting a 
nationalistic narrative “with more overt patriotic rhetoric than any previous Nanjing 
Massacre film creates a vulgarization that, once again, attempts to commemorate this 
human tragedy within a network of national agendas and a tradition of already flawed 
cinematic tributes.”197 In addition to this overemphasis of photographic proof, the film 
also aims to emulate the emotional impact of Holocaust films:  
                                                             
194 Berry, A History of Pain, 167. 
195 Berry, A History of Pain, 170. 
196 Berry, A History of Pain, 172. 
197 Berry, A History of Pain, 174. 
111 
 
Because of the thematic similarities with Spielberg’s 1993 Holocaust film 
Schindler’s List—one man working against all odds to preserve the lives of 
thousands amid unthinkable violence—Qixia Temple 1937 was widely marketed as 
the ‘Chinese Schindler’s List that will sweep the Oscars.’198  
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, comparisons between the Nanking Atrocity and the 
Holocaust were drawn in Chinese education, literature, and scholarship. So, Qixia 
Temple’s evocation of Holocaust cinema is not altogether novel. However, just as within 
any other Nanking representation, the rhetoric and motivations of such comparisons are 
all too apparent and the significance of the Atrocity as a unique, individual tragedy is 
undermined. David MacDonald notes this issue of representation through comparison in 
“Forgetting and Denying: Iris Chang, the Holocaust, and the Challenge of Nanking,” 
asserting that,  
Generally, it is assumed that other groups who invoke a ‘holocaust’ benefit from it, 
that it is a useful means of promoting and packaging one’s own history….However, 
it is by no means certain that adopting the vocabulary and imagery of another 
group’s dissimilar tragedy is the best means of articulating and representing one’s 
own history.199  
Ultimately, one cannot expect a tragedy to gain recognition and significance by 
being framed or repackaged through the same rhetorical frameworks. Thus, Qixia Temple 
further perpetuates the proving and assigning thematic popularity of Nanking films.  
 In contrast, May & August is a strikingly different type of Atrocity film, one that 
is not overtly preoccupied with the goal of “proving” the massacre or locating its 
perpetrators. This difference is apparent in several subtle stylistic differences, such as the 
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film’s opening, which inverts the typical black and white documentary footage 
introduction of most other Atrocity films: 
Instead of opening with documentary footage of the war, May & August begins with 
impressionistic pencil sketches of Nanjing. This marks a shift from an urge to 
‘prove’ history through actual photos and evidence to a desire to ‘portray’ the scars 
of the pas through a more symbolic vision. The purpose of May & August is not 
historical censure but psychological catharsis.200 
By abandoning the typical introductory style of Nanking films, May & August is 
able to overcome some of the major limitations of the “proof” category representations. 
Unlike Black Sun, gore and violence are not prominent features of the film; unlike 
Massacre in Nanjing, there are fewer attempts to demonstrate patriotic sacrifice or 
nationalistic sentiment. Rather, by focusing on the experiences of two sisters, May and 
August, the film tells a more personal narrative of Nanking experience.    
 Ultimately, though, the film was intensely criticized by PRC Nanjing Massacre 
historian (and the founder of the museum where the film was set to be premiered), Zhu 
Chengshan.201 Zhu protested historical inaccuracies, such as the film’s inaccurate death 
tolls or issues of continuity within various scenes. As Berry points out, Zhu’s criticisms 
are problematic given the fictional nature of the film: 
The ultimate irony is that May & August, a mass-market story about perseverance 
and the will to survive, the first film that clearly was not trying to be a historical 
docudrama about the Rape of Nanjing—let alone ‘prove’ that the massacre 
happened—could not escape the burden of proof and the weight of history. The 
critics seemed unable to see the film as anything but ‘history.’ Zhu Chengshan even 
went so far as to declare that its release would provide ‘evidence’ that the Japanese 
extremists could use to deny the very existence of the Nanjing Massacre! In the 
cases of Massacre in Nanjing and Black Sun, feature dramas took on the qualities of 
documentary—or even evidence—but here, an innocent ‘entertainment film’ never 
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intended to be ‘read’ as history was not only forced to shoulder that burden but also 
actually granted the power (by one of China’s foremost historians) to rewrite 
history.202 
Berry’s critique of the May & August controversy demonstrates the root issue 
with Nanking “evidence” films—fictional representations cannot and should not be 
interpreted as factual, historically-accurate investigations of the “truth,” even if works 
such as Massacre in Nanjing seem to confuse, perhaps intentionally, the distinctions 
between reality and fiction. By condemning films like May & August, Chinese critics are 
essentially advocating for a standard of Nanking cinema that precariously balances 
between these two extremes for maximum benefit; Nanking literary and cinematic 
representations can thus be both entertainment and education, without requiring either 
creative originality or complete historical accuracy.     
 Another 21st century development, the Nanking Atrocity’s first video game 
representation, also demonstrates the blurring of education and entertainment in modern 
Nanking adaptations:  
Presented as ‘edutainment,’ the video game brings visual representations of the 
Nanjing atrocities in the twenty-first century through interactive means unavailable 
to previous literary or even cinematic representations. The title of the game is most 
telling: Eyewitness—Nanjing Massacre. The player does not assume the role of a 
victim or a perpetrator; instead, he or she becomes a cameraman whose objective is 
to ‘shoot’ the atrocities playing out before his or her eyes.203 
Over the years, it is mediums of representation that have developed and adapted 
to the theme of proving and witnessing or attributing blame rather than vice versa. The 
lasting impact of Luo’s Massacre in Nanjing on the modern standard of Nanking 
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narratives is highly relevant to the nature of contemporary debates, and even scholarship, 
surrounding the Atrocity. The proliferation of works that fall under the same categories of 
proving truths and assigning blame has arguably done more to undermine the importance 
and recognition of the Atrocity, as over-dramatizations have turned the tragedies of the 
event into grotesque or melodramatic parodies. Given their national and international 
impact, it is important to critically analyze the ways in which these cinematic and literary 
representations make sense out of and derive meaning from the Atrocity. 
American Literature and Films: Emphasizing American Involvement and War 
Efforts and Depicting Humanity through Sino-Japanese Romance  
 When American literary and cinematic depictions of Nanking are called to mind, 
the primary text that symbolizes efforts to memorialize the Atrocity is undoubtedly Iris 
Chang’s 1991 The Rape of Nanking. Chang’s legacy is perhaps best summarized in 
Mitchel’s article for the Japan Times: 
For better or worse then, Chang has helped push the issue out of academia and into 
popular culture, where its impact will be far less predictable or manageable. At the 
very least, anti-Japanese sentiment is likely to be inflamed in China, where 
nationalist passions are already high. A tsunami of bad publicity is also certain to 
come from Europe and America, as Tokyo is fully aware.204 
Despite its potential historical inaccuracies, Chang’s text revolutionized Nanking 
debates and popularized the topic internationally. Perhaps more significantly than any 
other scholar in the 20th century, Chang made such a neglected topic in WWII history 
widely accessible and widely relevant, thereby breaking both literary and historical 
ground. As Masahiro Yamamoto notes in “A Tale of Two Atrocities: Critical Appraisal 
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of American Historiography,” the Nanking revival instigated in part due to Chang’s 
seminal text is a topic that deserves greater investigation:   
Given that the Atrocity has been known in the United States since 1937, thanks to 
media coverage by journalists such as F. Tillman Durdin and Archibald T. Steele, 
followed by extensive discussions in histories of modern China and Japan, the 
extreme sensation caused by Chang deserves close attention, especially because 
Americans were neither victims nor victimizers in the incident.205  
As noted in the Wartime Reporting section of this thesis, the U.S. played a major 
role in early Nanking reportage, and even framed justifications for its own wartime 
involvement around a barbaric Japanese “national character” as displayed in Nanking. 
MacDonald provides potential explanation for the revival of Atrocity memory: 
 The rise of memory and commemoration of Nanking and other instances of Chinese 
victimization has its root in Chinese Diaspora communities, particularly in the 
United States. These groups generally have more money, more coercive power, and 
better access to the Internet than their counterparts in the People’s Republic. Indeed, 
the New York Times recently identified a ‘cottage industry’ of remembrance, with 
‘dozens of groups working the Internet to publicize it, as well as recent 
documentaries, novels, and exhibits.’206  
As wealthier Chinese immigrants have settled in the U.S. and accessibility of 
Nanking scholarship has increased (worldwide and not simply within the U.S.), the 
opportunities for Chinese diaspora has flourished. While MacDonald’s assessment of 
greater economic and political freedom in the U.S. may have impacted the growth of 
Chinese diaspora and interest in the Nanking Atrocity, there is little evidence to support 
these factors as the primary or even significant reasons behind Chang’s success. Even 
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before Chang’s The Rape of Nanking gained international attention, geopolitical changes 
throughout China, the U.S., and Japan in the postwar years gradually led to the modern 
status of Nanking scholarship and debate. Furthermore, even scholars within the niche 
field of Nanking Atrocity memory have debated the factors that initiated international 
interest in the event. Yamamoto, for example, cites not comparative socioeconomic 
factors or political freedom as essential reasons for Nanking memory revival but 
attributes renewed interest to “ethnic prejudice and the wide gap in interpretations of the 
Atrocity between professional historians and the general public. The professional 
historians’ lack of fact-finding solidified the ordinary people’s image of the Atrocity, 
already created by amateur historians, and reinforced popular ethnic prejudice.”207 
 Thus, there is no clear, singular reason for renewed interest in Nanking. 
Furthermore, Chang’s text was not even the first modern American work concerning the 
Atrocity: 
In the mid-1990s (several years before the publication of Iris Chang’s landmark 
book), the Nanjing Massacre began to simultaneously capture the literary 
imagination of two American-based writers, R.C. Binstock and Paul West, who 
produced full-length novels inspired by the massacre, both published to critical 
acclaim in 1995.208  
Significantly, these two works popularized a common theme in American 
depictions of the Atrocity: the plots of Binstock’s The Tree of Heaven and West’s The 
Tent of Orange Mist both revolve around the development of a Sino-Japanese romance 
(with the term “romance” being used loosely). In The Tree of Heaven, a Chinese woman, 
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Li, falls in love with a Japanese soldier, Kuroda, after he rescues her from attempted 
gang-rape by his subordinates.209 As Berry asserts, the love story depicted in The Tree of 
Heaven is highly unusual, given the Chinese female’s abandonment by her Chinese 
before her rescue by a heroic Japanese soldier, who is later killed by Chinese soldiers. 
This narrative departs from the standard Chinese aggressor-victim interpretations by 
constructing a Sino-Japanese romance that the reader hopes will succeed, unlike the 
Chinese-Japanese love conflict of Massacre in Nanjing. West’s novel presents an even 
more unique tale of Sino-Japanese love between Scald Ibis, a girl forced into prostitution, 
and Colonel Hayashi, her Japanese pimp. While the “romance” genre that Berry 
categorizes the novel under seems unfitting for a story of sexual slavery, Ibis’ eventual 
acceptance of Hayashi’s guidance could serve as a possible explanation. Regardless, 
West’s novel demonstrates the significant difference between American and Chinese 
depictions of Nanking, as many scholars and educators in China have historically 
condemned women who appeared to “accept” their forced prostitution by Japanese 
oppressors.           
 While the theme of Sino-Japanese romance is apparent in early modern American 
depictions of Nanking, works such as The Tent of Orange Mist and The Tree of Heaven 
gradually became overshadowed by works that adhered to a separate literary theme: 
emphasizing the glories and heroism of American involvement. While it is unrealistic to 
pin the 1980s-90s Nanking revival in the U.S. (and worldwide) to Chang, her work 
certainly inspired the proliferation of the Western-perspective in Atrocity literature and 
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films. As one of the first texts to examine the roles of figures such as Minnie Vautrin and 
John Rabe in the Atrocity, Chang’s The Rape of Nanking gave filmmakers and writers a 
highly-marketable narrative for Nanking. Souhua Qi’s novel, When the Purple Mountain 
Burns, and Mo Hayder’s work, The Devil of Nanking, both examine the Atrocity from the 
perspective of Western figures. Qi’s work, which examines the perspective of historical 
figures from the NSZ,  
owes a debt to epic Chinese novels about the massacre published two decades 
earlier, for its narrative focus upon actual historical figures. It was, however, more 
visibly inspired by the recent string of English-language historical monographs such 
as American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin and 
The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe; the novel takes Vautrin, 
Rabe, and other key Western figures such as Dr. Robert Wilson as its chief 
subjects.210  
The popularity and marketability of these Western-centric plots is evidenced by 
the volume of post-Chang texts that adopt such a lens. In 2000, Hua-ling Hu, a Chinese 
language and literature professor at the University of Colorado, wrote American Goddess 
at the Rape of Nanking, lauding the missionary’s heroic efforts to give sanctuary to the 
Chinese women and soldiers. In 2010, Hua-ling Hu and Zhang Lian-hong co-edited and 
compiled The Undaunted Women of Nanking: The Wartime Diaries of Minnie Vautrin 
and Tsen Shui-fang.         
 John Rabe was given similar treatment. In 1997, The Good Man of Nanking: The 
Diaries of John Rabe was first published, making widely-accessible for the first time 
English translations of his personal diaries; in 2009, Rabe’s legacy resulted in a major 
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motion picture dedicated to his experiences at Nanking, City of War: The Story of John 
Rabe.      
In contrast to the historical lens of When the Purple Mountain Burns, Hayder’s 
thriller examines the unfolding mystery of a Nanking secret from the perspective of a 
modern Englishwoman. Like Massacre in Nanjing, the plot of Hayder’s novel is centered 
around the preservation of filmic Nanking evidence: 
The importance of the preserved black-and-white moving images also places this 
unique novel within the same tradition as Massacre in Nanjing, which also featured 
a Western woman’s quest for ‘proof’ of the massacre in order to testify to the world 
about what really happened….Nearly twenty years after Katie smuggled photos out 
of China in Massacre in Nanjing, the urge to prove what happened is just as 
powerful, and the West is still the mediator.211  
Examining these works within the larger context of Nanking Atrocity 
representations, the effects of early interpretations of the event become clear. The 
Nanking narratives of Western objectivity or heroic intervention, established during the 
war and solidified during the Tokyo Tribunals, have become repurposed and repackaged 
in modern cinema. While the reasons for employing this narrative likely separate along 
national boundaries (American implementation for marketability, Chinese 
implementation for objective accountability), the theme of the Western safekeeper of 
evidence or testimony has become a major component of Chinese and American 
representations. Thus, by employing the themes of the Western presence at Nanking 
(literally or figuratively), through historical fiction or through more modern plotlines of 
evidence preservation, Hayder’s The Devil of Nanking and Qi’s When the Purple 
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Mountain Burns serve as exemplars of American literary representations of the Nanking 
Atrocity.           
 This theme of Western observation and intervention, popularized by literary 
works like Chang’s, are the most notable features of American Nanking films. Scholar 
Damien Kinney examines the proliferation of these post-Chang, Western-centric Nanking 
narratives, arguing that Chang-influenced interpretations of the Atrocity have a strong 
marketability in American film industries. In discussing the 2007 dramatized 
documentary, Nanking, Kinney references an interview of the director Ted Leonsis, who 
claimed that he first conceived of the idea for his film after reading Chang’s obituary in 
the New York Times:      
This indicates how ‘marketable’ the massacre story had become as a result of 
Chang’s impact: through her writing, North Americans became acquainted with the 
massacre, and this interest in Chinese history was noted in China and has aided its 
‘rediscovery.’212 
 Directed by businessman Ted Leoniss, Nanking is an amalgamation of both 
Chinese and Western Nanking cinema styles. Following in the “proving the event” theme 
of Chinese representations, Nanking “couples archival footage of the August 1937 
bombing of Shanghai, the bombing of Nanjing from September and the subsequent 
massacre with both survivors’ and participants’ testimonies.”213 Just as the Chinese 
Massacre in Nanjing and Black Sun merge real documentary footage with fictionalized 
depictions, Nanking similarly employs this tactic of enhancing believability through 
existing Nanking materials. However, the film examines the unfolding tragedies of the 
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event through the perspective of the Safety Zone figures—Vautrin, Rabe, and Bob 
Wilson, a devoted surgeon left to treat hundreds and thousands of Nanking’s wounded 
civilians and soldiers after the city’s fall. Thus, Nanking serves as an exemplar of 
American and Chinese Nanking narrativity. Since the film is one of the most recent 
cinematic representations of the Atrocity, it is possible that it also serves to demonstrate 
the international exchange and adaptation of Nanking narratives—Leoniss’ work could 
signal the gradual integration of Chinese and American interpretations of the event as 
considerations of marketability determine the most profitable versions of collective 
memory.           
 The Atrocity narratives constructed, revised, and perpetuated through Chinese, 
American, and Japanese literary and cinematic representations of the event demonstrate 
the ways that public memory of a tragedy is shaped through not only “official” texts and 
sources but through the “unofficial” mediums of popular culture as well. An examination 
of Nanking narratives reveals the evolution Atrocity memory over the decades. For China 
and Japan, there is a clear crystallization of accepted Nanking narratives; for the U.S., 
there is a clear shift toward the most marketable, Western-centric representations.  
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Conclusion 
The evolution of Nanking narratives, constructed, revised, and perpetuated 
through “official” sources and through popular culture demonstrates the subjectivity of 
memory. In the prominent narrative of the Atrocity, popularized and propagated since the 
1980s, Japan has become a villain of two atrocities—that of the 1937 invasion of the city 
and a larger inadherence to the ethics of repentance and commemoration; China has 
become both a mythic hero and a tragic victim; generally, the U.S. has been depicted as 
an objective witness to and secure protector of the “truth.” These narratives are easy to 
problematize, as evidenced by the volumes of scholarship produced not only about the 
event and its factual realities but its historiography and remembrance.    
 Although this thesis has dealt primarily with secondary source material, no other 
work has examined the evolution of Atrocity memory through a linked analysis of 
journalistic, educational, literary, and cinematic materials. These texts are not separate 
exemplars of the amassing of collective memory. Rather, these sources, together, 
demonstrate a historical shift in not only the nature of Nanking memories but in the 
mediums by which these narratives become socially reinforced. The implications and 
motivations of the collectivization of memory are worthy of examination, as this process 
of amalgamation is inextricably linked to the formation of national identity. As 
demonstrated by the previous chapters, changes in domestic economic, political, and 
social status coincide with evolution of historical narratives of the Atrocity. In the pursuit 
of national unification and identification, China, Japan, and the U.S. have revised 
wartime perceptions in order to promote the most effective narratives of involvement. 
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Yamamoto asserts the negative impact of these monolithic narratives on real Nanking 
scholarship and reconciliation:  
A possible explanation for the scarcity of empirical research is that American and 
Western historians have already solidified an image of the Atrocity and are reluctant 
to reconsider it critically. Any challenge to the consensus is likely to be seen as 
‘revisionism’ worthy of the condemnation show to Holocaust deniers.214  
Thus, as Yamamoto argues, these cemented Nanking memories are not often open 
to revision, unless this reinterpretative process is led by official figures. Appropriate 
narratives have been established by these nations in order to suit the changing social, 
political, and economic status of each.        
 However, this collectivization and politicization of memory has only exacerbated 
tensions between the countries, revealing the ways in which the act of national 
remembering is often more detrimental for its people—those who live through, are 
impacted by, and must reconcile such events—than beneficial. For China and Japan, 
debates over appropriate treatment of the Atrocity has led to unnecessary tension between 
the countries, affecting all spheres of society from diplomatic interactions to online 
forums. The consequences public memory manipulation and exploitation is exemplified 
in the Nanking Atrocity, which, decades separated from the actual event, has become the 
ultimate symbol of Sino-Japanese tension.       
 However, the implications of public memory formation expand beyond the scope 
of the Nanking Atrocity. The question of political interference in the remembering or 
forgetting of important shared moments has become increasingly relevant. In the U.S., 
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the removal of Confederate statues has gained international attention as groups dispute 
the role and relative value of these monuments in preserving history. Similarly, the 
Japanese protection of the Yasukuni shrine, which commemorates figures including A-
list war criminals, has garnered increasing international criticism, particularly from 
Atrocity historians and scholars who feel that commemoration and glorification are 
inextricably linked. In China, physical and figurative monuments to Communist history 
complicate the open discussion of decades of public suffering caused by political strife. 
The manifestations of politicized public memory are apparent worldwide, and thus the 
importance of investigating the topic of ethical commemoration is undeniable.    
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